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INTRODUCTION 
Auditing is not romantic.  The joke has it that an extroverted 
auditor is the one who looks at his client’s shoes when he talks to 
him, rather than at his own shoes.1  This gray figure, however, plays a 
key economic role.  For markets to allocate capital efficiently, 
investors need to make informed decisions when they buy shares in 
public corporations.  As those who review and certify the financial 
information that companies disclose, auditors are, in the words of the 
United States Supreme Court, “public watchdogs” who must have 
“complete fidelity to the public trust.”2 
 
 1 LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 181 (2003). 
 2 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (holding that 
the Internal Revenue Service could compel an accountant serving as an independent 
auditor to disclose work papers it used in the course of verifying the corporation’s 
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Somewhat surprisingly, these public watchdogs are hired by the 
very corporations that they audit.  The Supreme Court has cautioned 
that this does not mean that the auditor “works for” the corporate 
client.  Instead, “by certifying to the public reports that collectively 
depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor 
assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment 
relationship with the client.”3  This is a tall order.  In this Article, I will 
argue that it is too tall. 
In 1934, Justice Harlan Stone famously remarked that  
when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a 
close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its major faults 
will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, 
the precept as old as holy writ, that “a man cannot serve two 
masters.”4 
Even though other eras of financial scandals have now come and 
gone, auditors are still asked to do that, to treat the public as master, 
though engaged and paid by another master—the audited 
corporation.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was Congress’ response 
to the Enron collapse and other spectacular accounting failures.  It 
stiffened penalties for faulty financial disclosure and improved the 
supervision of auditors.  It left, however, the two-master problem 
unresolved. 
This Article will argue that current securities law sets up the 
wrong relationships among the auditor, the auditor’s client (the 
audited corporation), and the public, thereby creating a regulatory 
structure fundamentally at odds with its regulatory purpose.  The 
structure creates incentives for the auditor to serve the client, while 
the law’s purpose calls for the auditor to serve the public.  Therefore, 
the law should be reformed so that auditors recognize proper 
incentives and serve only one master, a master whose own interests 
are aligned with those of the investing public. 
Briefly, securities disclosure auditing works as follows: a 
corporation’s management generates financial data and prepares the 
financial statements organizing and analyzing the data.  Outside 
auditors engaged by the corporation spot-test the underlying data 
 
statement of its contingent tax liabilities and observing that “to insulate from 
disclosure a certified public accountant’s interpretations of the client’s financial 
statements would be to ignore the significance of the accountant’s role as a 
disinterested analyst charged with public obligations”). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1934), 
quoted in Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After 
Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002). 
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and evaluate whether the financial statements follow accepted 
accounting principles.5  If the auditors are satisfied, they issue an 
attestation that states: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . 
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of ABC 
Company as of [date] in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles.”6 
Making such an attestation is an elaborate job involving 
substantial professional judgment.  The underlying economic activity 
of X Corporation is almost surely complex, generating complicated 
financial data to be reviewed.  And, the standards used in the review, 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), are 
themselves complex.  No regulatory scheme could possibly govern 
the entire job.  Not only can there never be a policeman at each 
auditor’s elbow, but even if there were, the auditing standards 
themselves could not anticipate every situation in which the public 
interest in good auditing might be threatened.  Regulation that 
would depend on supervision and the threat of punishment simply 
could not ensure that the thousands of judgment calls involved in an 
audit would be made with the public’s interest in mind.  This is 
especially true if, in addition to the public’s interest, the auditor must 
also consider the interests of the audited corporation.  Therefore, the 
law must give auditors their own incentive to do what is in the 
public’s interest.  Even though auditors are subject to regulatory 
supervision, they are still engaged and paid by a principal.  This 
means that regulators should be certain that this principal has an 
incentive to want the auditor to do the sort of job that serves the 
public’s interest in transparency. 
Part I discusses how securities disclosure auditors came to serve 
two masters.  Auditing generally involves two distinct roles, which 
securities law mistakenly has combined into one.  Since the Middle 
Ages, auditors have served as detectives for owners of enterprises, 
scrutinizing books kept by managers and reporting back to the 
owners what they discovered.  Owners want these reports to be 
candid so they can monitor their agents.  More recently, auditors 
began to play another role, that of certifying information that the 
client discloses to a third party.  In “certification auditing,” the client 
is interested in the auditor’s approval of the information, not an 
exacting assessment of its quality.  The Securities Acts of 1933 and 
 
 5 Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-
visited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 55 (2002). 
 6 Erick D. Prohs, Periodic Financial Reporting—A Relic of the Past?, 27 J. CORP. L. 
481, 493 n.108 (2002). 
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1934 joined these two very different roles.  The auditor is supposed to 
play the first role, that of scrutinizing the corporation’s financial 
statements in order to give a candid assessment of quality (the 
auditor as “public watchdog”).  The auditor’s actual fee-paying client, 
however, is the audited corporation who hires the auditor to play the 
second role, that of certifying information.  This gives the auditor 
essentially two clients—the public and the corporation—each with 
different interests. 
Part II addresses developments in recent decades that increased 
the tension in serving these two masters.  Consolidation in the 
accounting profession and growth of non-audit consulting services 
increased pressures on individual auditors to defer to their clients’ 
views, while the complexity and flexibility of the GAAP standards 
supplied the means to do this; auditors may give considerable 
deference to their clients’ analyses and yet still certify that the 
statements comply with GAAP.  These forces helped produce Enron 
and other recent scandals.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20027 
improved the auditors’ situation somewhat, particularly by protecting 
their independence from their audit clients while simultaneously 
giving the clients more incentives to treat their auditors as detectives. 
Good reform, however, should go further.  Part III looks at 
auditing regulation from a broader perspective.  It is part of a more 
general scheme of regulation via information disclosure, and there 
are clear empirical characteristics that distinguish healthy disclosure 
schemes from those that die on the vine.  I assess specific proposals 
for auditing reform in light of these needs and explain why the best is 
Financial Statement Insurance (“FSI”).  It meets the criteria for a 
healthy disclosure scheme, and it returns clarity to the auditor’s role.  
In an FSI regime, auditors will have one role: they will be detectives, 
working for a client whose financial fortunes depend on their good 
detective work. 
 
 7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 28 & 29 U.S.C.). 
  
1034 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1029 
I. HOW AUDITORS CAME TO WEAR TWO HATS:  
A BRIEF JOURNEY THROUGH TIME 
A. Traditional Auditing 
1. The Auditor as Detective 
Modern American auditing traces its roots to medieval England.  
Lords would appoint bailiffs to manage their lands, crops, and cattle.  
They would then appoint auditors to keep tabs on the bailiffs.  These 
auditors served as detectives.  They reviewed the bailiffs’ written 
accounts and other records and examined their managerial 
decisions.8  Auditing was not just available to aristocrats.  In an early 
version of mandatory information disclosure, anyone whose property 
was being held by another person could demand an accounting, and 
auditors would be appointed by a court to test the validity of the 
accounting.  After 1285, court-appointed auditors could even send a 
person to prison if the accounting showed that money was missing.9 
Continuing in this vein, nineteenth-century British pioneers of 
modern auditing advertised their services as a way to ferret out fraud.  
In the 1840s, William Deloitte, founder of the firm known today as 
Deloitte & Touche, famously exposed fraudulent practices in the 
operations of the Great Northern Railway and Great Eastern 
Steamship Company.10 
As recently as the early twentieth century, this original role of 
the audit held sway in the United States.  Because businesses tended 
to be small and closely held, owners would hire auditors mainly to 
compare cash holdings with the records to see if the treasurer or 
cashier was honest.11  Indeed, this remains a core auditing function.  
The standard task of what is now called internal auditing is to inform 
owners of the activities of their agents and employees.  In the words 
of a basic accounting textbook: “Whatever the organization, all audits 
have a similar purpose, namely to provide some independent 
assurance that those entrusted with resources are made accountable 
to those who have provided the resources.”12 
 
 8 S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 275–97 (2d ed. 
1981). 
 9 See Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 11. 
 10 Jonathan Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud: A Change in How Auditors Work, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at A1, A14 [hereinafter Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate 
Fraud]. 
 11 WALTER A. STAUB, AUDITING DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PRESENT CENTURY 9–10 
(1942). 
 12 JOHN ARNOLD ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 19 (2d ed. 1994). 
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2. The Accounting Standard Set by the Auditor’s Client 
The nature of the standard the auditor uses to assess the quality 
of the audited financial information constitutes another variable 
influencing the success or failure of auditing.  The standard itself can 
introduce distortions, as will be discussed later.  Logically, the 
standard should be suited to—if not actually dictated by—the needs 
of the third party information user.  This is easily achieved when the 
owner is the only information user.  The method used in financial 
records to classify items such as income and expense and value of 
assets can be idiosyncratic to the owner.13  The detective-auditor need 
only confirm internal consistency in accordance with the owner’s 
accounting methods, not those set by anyone else. 
3. Employment as Motivation and the Approval Bias 
What motivations can we expect auditors to have and what 
temptations will they face?  Given the premise that regulation of 
something as complex as auditing must take incentives into account, 
I will, throughout this Article, address literature on behavioral 
studies.  Biases specific to auditors have been the subject of a series of 
psychological studies.14  If auditors predictably can be expected to 
exhibit particular tendencies in their review of accounts, a good 
regulatory scheme should take those tendencies into account.  Such a 
scheme should try to set up incentives that fight these biases; it 
should certainly refrain from creating incentives that encourage 
auditors to be biased. 
We start with the incentives of the auditor who plays the role of 
detective for the client.  So far, I have painted a rosy picture of the 
detective auditor, but certainly the detective auditor is not immune 
from bias.  There may be agency problems such that the auditor puts 
his or her own interests above those of the client.  Auditors might be 
lazy, accept bribes, or become overly friendly with the people they are 
supposed to monitor, thereby clouding their judgment and 
succumbing to “self-serving bias,” in which their judgment is 
 
 13 STAUB, supra note 11, at 10–11. 
 14 Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. 
REV. 97, 100–01 (2002).  For an extensive discussion of biases and application to 
auditing, see Robert Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into 
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 141–71 (2000) [hereinafter Prentice, 
The Case of the Irrational Auditor]. 
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influenced by their self-interest.15  In this, however, auditors are no 
different from any other employees or contract professionals. 
Many auditors’ biases identified in behavioral studies literature 
involve modern disclosure auditing rather than traditional detective-
style auditing.  One of the biases, the “approval bias,” is already 
present, however, even when auditors are asked solely to do detective 
work.  The “approval” bias refers to the tendency of people to 
approve judgments that others have made.  That is, auditors are likely 
to approve accounts generated by others even if they themselves 
would have analyzed the figures in a less favorable manner.16  Notably, 
this bias is not inherent in the relationship between traditional 
detective-style auditors and their clients.  Indeed, if anything, the 
detective-auditor may seek to please the client by being overly harsh, 
which mitigates the approval bias. 
In short, the detective-auditor–client relationship is relatively 
straightforward.  Audit clients are business owners who will use the 
auditor’s report themselves and who want the truth.  As employees or 
contractors of this owner, auditors can please the client by being 
candid; auditors have no particular incentives derived from the 
auditor–client role itself to act otherwise. 
B. Auditing for Special-Purpose Disclosure 
1. The Auditor as Certifier 
A second role for auditors developed during the last century.  
Although auditors continued to do internal auditing, companies also 
asked them to certify financial information for disclosure to third 
parties, such as banks and sector regulators.  Auditors certifying 
information for third-party disclosure have departed from the old 
role of doing detective work for the client.  Now, as far as the client is 
concerned, the auditor’s function is to approve the information, not 
scrutinize it. 
The third party receiving the information has a different 
interest.  It wants the information to be accurate, and it relies on the 
auditor’s certification as an indication of accuracy.  With regard to 
the third party information user, the auditor is considered a 
gatekeeper, that is, a “reputational intermediar[y] who provide[s] 
 
 15 Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 168–70; Robert A. 
Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 428 (2003) 
[hereinafter Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy]. 
 16 See Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, supra note 15, at 423–25. 
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verification and certification services to investors.”17  The third party’s 
reliance on the auditor as gatekeeper is induced by the auditor’s 
reputation for professional skill and integrity.  In economic terms, 
the company hiring an auditor to certify its financial disclosure 
“rents” the auditor’s good reputation.18  The theory of certification 
auditing is that this reputational bond is reliable because it is too 
valuable as a professional asset to sacrifice for the interest of any 
single client.19 
In addition to relying on the auditor’s reputational bond, the 
third party can take its own steps to understand the quality of the 
disclosed information and seek to have it improved.  For instance, the 
third party can insist that the disclosing entity provide additional 
information or quality assurances by threatening to withhold desired 
accommodations such as lending or regulatory approval. 
2. Third-Party Accounting Standards 
If, as discussed above, it is helpful for financial information to be 
presented in a form suitable to the needs of the information user 
(rather than the information discloser), then logic dictates that the 
third party (who is requiring the audit) set the accounting standards.  
This would mean that certification auditing would involve seeing that 
a company’s financial records live up to an extrinsic standard 
dictated by others.20 
Regulatory agencies in fact did promulgate such standards.  In 
1906, the Interstate Commerce Commission set uniform standards 
for railroad accounting.21  State and municipal regulation of 
electricity, natural gas, street railways, and other public utilities, 
which began early in the century, also included requirements for 
accounting.22  World War I excess profits and war profits taxes 
encouraged depreciation of asset purchases over time,23 requiring 
auditors to examine how the depreciation had been calculated.  
Firms that provided war material under cost-plus contracts needed to 
 
 17 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers]. 
 18 Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different?: An 
Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firms’ Audits of Large Clients,  
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=468761. 
 19 Id. 
 20 STAUB, supra note 11, at 11, 89. 
 21 See id. at 15. 
 22 Id. at 34–35. 
 23 Id. at 13. 
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identify their costs, further presenting complex judgments for 
auditors to review.24  The Federal Reserve Bank enunciated an 
auditing standard when it directed auditors to examine inventory and 
accounts receivable of borrowers from member banks, rather than 
simply relying on the owners’ valuation.25 
There was an exception to this practice of agencies setting the 
accounting standards.  In the case of regulated street railways, 
accountants successfully lobbied to be the ones to set the standards 
that would be acceptable to the regulators.  Interestingly, in a series 
of 1941 lectures at the Harvard Business School, a leading accountant 
advanced the argument for standards set by accountants, rather than 
government.  He detailed a number of technical reasons why 
government accounting standards were unworkable and why the 
street railway standards were better.  He noted that railroad and 
utility regulators later abandoned the standards they had set 
themselves and turned to standards recommended by the 
accountants.26 
Logic suggests that accountants are best suited to set accounting 
standards.  They can use their professional expertise to design 
systems that present financial information in a useful form for third 
parties.  It must be kept in mind, however, that standards invariably 
skew results.  If standard-setters are not themselves the third party 
information users, they may have incentives to design standards that 
do not best serve users’ interests.  As will be discussed in Part II.B, 
standard setting and the possibility of distortion is an important and 
controversial issue in current securities disclosure auditing. 
3. Reputation as Motivation and the Attachment Bias 
In certification auditing, incentives become more complicated.  
The auditor no longer enjoys the simplicity of working for a client (a 
business owner) who also represents the only user of the financial 
information (which concerns the management of the owner’s assets).  
Rather, the client is the discloser of the information.  The user of the 
information is a third party.  The client and the information user 
seek different things from the audit. 
The information user has reason to hope the audit will be 
candid—the same sort of audit that the owner employing a detective 
auditor demands.27  The auditor’s responsibility to this information 
 
 24 Id. at 14. 
 25 Id. at 10–11. 
 26 See STAUB, supra note 11, at 16–21. 
 27 See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
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user is, however, limited.  An information user who can prove that 
the auditor failed “to exercise reasonable care or competence in 
obtaining or communicating the information” can recover damages 
from the auditor on a theory of negligent misrepresentation.28  To 
recover, however, the plaintiff must show that the auditor negligently 
certified the information, knowing it was being supplied for a 
particular third party’s benefit and that the third party relied on the 
negligently certified information to its detriment.29 
On the other hand, the auditor’s client has more subtle 
incentives.  It wants the auditor to catch errors that the third party 
might find anyway, since a suspicious third party can challenge the 
financial data it has received, whether formally as in a utility rate 
setting procedure, or informally as when banks ask questions and 
demand back-up documentation from would-be borrowers.  The 
client, however, has no reason to insist that its auditor correct more 
subtle, hard-to-detect distortions in information presentation if those 
distortions depict the client in a good light.  To the contrary, it has 
reason to want the auditor to approve such distortions. 
What should the auditor do?  Personal ethics and professional 
standards30 may provide a reason for the auditor to do the sort of 
candid audit that helps the information user.  More germane to this 
discussion, auditors have a self-interested incentive to abide by 
professional ethics inasmuch as they wish to achieve a reputation for 
professional integrity.  As noted, this is a valuable economic asset 
worth protecting by continuing to do good work.  The auditor, 
however, also faces powerful contrary incentives to do the sort of less 
candid audit that the client might prefer.  “The reality is that 
reputation means precious little if a firm has no clients.”31  Thus, 
 
 28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
 29 Id.; see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752–60 (Cal. 1992) 
(discussing different state-law treatments of auditor liability to third parties); Glenn 
K. Jackson, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 30 The professional standards of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (“AICPA”) provide: 
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility 
to the public.  The accounting profession’s public consists of clients, 
credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and 
financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and 
integrity of certified public accountants to maintain the orderly 
functioning of commerce.  This reliance imposes a public interest 
responsibility on certified public accountants.  The public interest is 
defined as the collective well-being of the community of people and 
institutions the profession serves. 
AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 53.01 (1988). 
 31 Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 204. 
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reputation is constantly pitted against the need to gain and retain 
business.  Accounting firms, in fact, do risk their reputations for 
business reasons.  For example, in the mid-1990s, some of the then-
Big Six accounting firms were caught charging their regular fees for 
tax preparation work actually done by low-paid, part-time and 
temporary workers.32  If it were terribly important to protect 
reputation, the savings would not have been worth the risk (which 
materialized) of being found out. 
There is also an unconscious desire to please one’s client that 
researchers have identified as the “attachment” bias.33  In different 
studies, both professional auditors and business students interpreted 
financial information differently depending on the interests of the 
“client” they were told to pretend they worked for.34  In a 2002 study 
(post-Enron), experimenters asked 193 auditors working for a major 
United States accounting firm to review ambiguous sets of financial 
information from Company X.  Those told to assume that X was their 
client were thirty percent more likely to approve the accounting than 
those playing the role of auditors hired by someone thinking of 
doing business with X.35 
In another study, business students were given information 
about another fictional company and divided into four role-play 
groups: those selling the company, the sellers’ auditors, those buying 
it, and the buyers’ auditors.  The “sellers’ auditors” valued the 
company higher than did the “buyers’ auditors.” 
The researchers then asked the students to step out of the 
assigned roles and simply figure out what the company was actually 
worth.36  Strikingly, students were not able to cast off the biases of 
their earlier roles.  Those who had previously taken the part of 
sellers’ auditors still said it was worth more, and those who had played 
the buyers’ auditors said it was worth less.  The difference was 
significant.  Even when an actual reward (extrinsic to the 
experiment) was offered for the best impartial estimate, the different 
estimates of the company’s value did not change.37  This suggests that 
working for a client not only can create a tendency for an auditor to 
make judgment calls that favor the client, but that this inclination is 
hard to cast off. 
 
 32 Id. at 203–04. 
 33 Certification auditors also face the approval bias inherent in reviewing 
someone else’s work.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 34 Bazerman et al., supra note 14, at 97. 
 35 Id. at 100–01. 
 36 Id. at 100. 
 37 Id. 
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II. DEALING WITH TWO MASTERS:  
THE DILEMMA OF THE “INDEPENDENT” AUDITOR 
With the passage of the federal securities acts in 1933 and 1934, 
a third role for auditors arose, namely the review and certification of 
financial information disclosed by public corporations.  This new role 
effectively caused auditors to have to answer to two masters with 
conflicting interests. 
A. The Auditor as Certifier and Detective 
The regulation of securities disclosure auditing must be viewed 
in its context as part of the general system of federal regulation of 
securities.  The system’s most basic goal is nothing less than a healthy, 
productive economy in which resources are allocated to their best 
uses.  This is achieved not by centralized planning, but by the 
protection and promotion of free, efficient capital markets so that 
resource allocation results from myriad individual decisions.38  Unlike 
earlier state Blue Sky laws, federal law does not try to regulate 
securities offerings on the merits.  Shares can be sold regardless of 
the issuer’s business plan, however unlikely the business is to succeed.  
Investors are free to take risks, even very great ones. 
Regulation simply seeks to ensure that investors have the ability 
to know what they are getting into.  The law requires that 
corporations selling shares to the public (“issuers”39), make 
substantial disclosure of financial information to the public both 
when shares are first offered for sale, and continually thereafter, for 
as long as shares are traded on regulated exchanges.  Just as investors 
privately make investment decisions and issuers privately disclose 
information, so too independent auditors privately certify the quality 
of the information.  This practice contrasts with, for instance, grain 
inspection, where the U.S. Department of Agriculture, not the farmer 
or grain elevator operator, certifies grade and fitness.40 
The public uses this audited information in two distinct ways.  In 
one sense, the “public” is a third party, analogous to lenders, 
regulatory agencies, and others who might deal with the corporation.  
Potential investors review the public financial data to decide whether 
they want to buy the corporation’s shares and, if so, at what price.  
But in another sense, the disclosure serves a completely different 
 
 38 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 30–31 (2001). 
 39 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2000). 
 40 7 U.S.C. § 79(a) (2000) (section heading—”Grain required to be officially 
inspected”). 
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“public,” namely those who already own the corporation’s shares.  
With regard to this group, public financial disclosure is analogous to 
internal reports created by managers of businesses for the benefit of 
the business owners.  Because share ownership is so widely disbursed, 
this disclosure must be public.  Even if information were only 
disclosed to shareholders, it would almost certainly become public at 
some point. 
In preparing financial information, the distinction between 
these two information uses is generally ignored.  It even seems a bit 
silly.  Through a call to a broker or a few computer keystrokes, a 
shareholder can become a non-shareholder, or vice versa, in the 
blink of an eye.  Obviously, corporations cannot, and thus do not, 
provide different financial information to each group. 
When it comes to auditing, however, this distinction is critical.  
Inasmuch as the corporation as a whole is disclosing information to 
third parties (potential shareholders), the auditor–client relationship 
is analogous to certification auditing.  The corporation hires the 
auditor and has reason to want deferential certification auditing, with 
judgment calls that favor the corporation.  The third party is left to 
challenge the information if it can.  But, inasmuch as the information 
constitutes the report of corporate management to the owners 
(actual shareholders), the auditor–client relationship is analogous to 
detective auditing.  The auditor should be reporting to the owner 
and providing a thorough, candid review of the books kept by 
management. 
Auditing regulation has suffered from the failure to recognize 
this conceptual distinction.  On the one hand, the law provides that 
corporations hire their own auditors, which creates an auditor–client 
relationship that triggers the incentives of certification auditing—the 
corporation wants a deferential audit to induce the third parties to 
deal with it on favorable terms.  What has not been appreciated is 
that this “certification auditing” only makes sense when the third 
party is strong and able to challenge the data on its own.  Members of 
the investing public, however, do not have the requisite strength and 
ability.  Instead, they rely on the auditor to challenge the quality of 
the data and not merely to provide a deferential certification.  The 
regulatory purpose of the securities laws demands that auditors act like 
detectives so that investors will have good information to use as the 
basis for their decisions.  The Supreme Court put this succinctly when 
it called the auditor the “public’s watchdog.”  The regulatory structure, 
however, gives the auditor a principal with incentive not to want 
detective auditing.  Thus, the structure is in conflict with the purpose. 
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Though the original regulatory structure was the same as that 
used in certification auditing, it was more or less suited for providing 
the necessary detective auditing for a number of years.  Changes in 
business and accounting practice, however, provided incentives for 
auditors to defer to their clients’ interests while flexible accounting 
standards provided the means by allowing auditors to certify that a 
broad spectrum of financial disclosure complied with the required 
GAAP.  These factors contributed to, if not caused, the auditing 
scandals of 2000–2001.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made a 
number of reforms and attempted to give the auditor a principal with 
the proper incentives to demand detective auditing.  Nevertheless, it 
does not change the basic structure with its mismatched incentives.  
Therefore, further reform is necessary. 
1. The Original Certification Model of Securities 
Disclosure Auditing 
Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, an issuer’s shares can 
be sold or traded on a regulated U.S. stock exchange only if the 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first approves a prospectus 
containing financial statements, and the company continues to 
disclose financial information in annual and quarterly reports.  All of 
these statements must be audited by “independent accountants.”41 
The basic pre-Sarbanes-Oxley securities regulation scheme 
contains a number of ways to preserve the independence of these 
certification auditors.  First, as certified public accountants, auditors 
remain subject to state regulation and to professional discipline 
through professional organizations and peer review.  Second, 
auditors42 must be formally independent.  They may not share family 
ties, material financial interests, or common employees with the 
audited corporation.43  Third, the law gives the SEC the ability to play 
the role that the strong third party plays in standard certification 
auditing.  It can review and question suspicious information.  When 
an issuer sells shares to the public for the first time, the SEC is in a 
very strong position.  The issuer cannot sell its shares until the SEC 
approves the prospectus.44  Once shares begin trading, however, the 
 
 41 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j, 77aa(26), 78m(a) (Supp. II 2002); 17 C.F.R. § 229.302 
(2005). 
 42 The defined term “auditor” refers to both individual accountants who conduct 
an audit and their firms.  17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01. 
 43 Id. 
 44 15 U.S.C. § 77f. 
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SEC need not approve in advance the financial disclosures, but may 
conduct ex post facto review. 
The private incentives of corporations and auditors helped to 
make this system work in two respects.  First, auditors commonly 
practiced on their own or in small firms.  Their professional 
reputations for quality auditing were too valuable to destroy by 
acquiescing in the misleading disclosure of any single client.  They 
had a financial incentive to stand firm.  Second, audited corporations 
had an incentive not to push their auditors too hard because the 
auditor might quit.  Under SEC regulations, if an auditor is dismissed 
or resigns, the corporation must disclose that fact with an 
explanation.45  Auditors willing to risk losing a client rather than 
compromising their standards can have some clout.  Some studies 
have shown that while a “qualified” auditor’s opinion has little effect 
on share prices, a change in auditor can result in lower prices,46 and 
could possibly incite an SEC investigation. 
2. Strains on the Regulatory System Skew the Incentives 
As technology and the economy evolved over the past seventy-
plus years, this regulatory system became less able to ensure the 
independence of auditors or give them the incentive to be 
watchdogs. 
For one thing, the underlying economic activity described in 
financial statements has changed drastically since 1934.  Public 
companies are far bigger, creating more financial information to deal 
with, especially since the advent of computers.  “Audit engagement 
teams” from accounting firms increasingly work for just a few audit 
clients, or sometimes just one.47  For instance, Andersen’s lead 
partner on the Enron account worked only for Enron.48  Additionally, 
the change from an industrial to an information-based economy 
created new problems in basic accounting and therefore in the 
auditing that controlled the quality of the accounting.  Using 
established methods, accountants could confidently audit records of 
companies whose assets were mostly physical plant and inventory and 
whose businesses functioned according to predictable cycles (e.g., 
complete the “work in progress,” sell it, collect accounts receivable, 
 
 45 17 C.F.R. § 229.304. 
 46 Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 207–08. 
 47 Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 269. 
 48 Jonathan R. Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, 
Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1170 
(2003). 
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etc.).  Now, many assets are intangible, such as projections of future 
income streams.  Their present value is speculative and sensitive to 
assumptions made by management, making it “extremely difficult, 
even for a well-intentioned auditor, to dispute and reject the 
projection of a manager wishing to improve the appearance of his 
financial statements.”49 
The accounting profession also changed radically, in a way that 
compromised the ability of the regulatory scheme to protect the 
independence of auditors from their clients.  Reputation has lost its 
central position, and auditors’ financial independence from their 
clients has eroded.  The story in a nutshell is that, like lawyers, 
accountants and auditors were once protected from price 
competition by professional association rules against advertising, 
soliciting rival firms’ clients, or bidding for business.50  Firms engaged 
in only partial competition, but that competition was in the areas of 
quality and reputation, a basic premise of certification auditing.  In 
the 1970s, however, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) dropped the restrictive rules in response to 
threatened federal antitrust action.51  This created price competition.  
The competition eventually led to concentration in the Big Eight, 
Seven, Six, etc. 
The Big Four accounting firms now control more than 60% of 
the U.S. market for all accounting services.52  This dominance, 
however, is far more striking in the field of auditing.  A 2003 General 
Accounting Office (“GAO”) study (mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act) found that the companies for which the Big Four do the 
auditing represent over 99% of all public company sales.53  The Big 
Four audit all companies with annual sales of $5 billion or more.54  Of 
the companies with sales between $250 million and $5 billion, the Big 
 
 49 Joshua Ronen, Financial Statement Insurance, 4 J. FORENSIC ACCT. 1 (2003), 
available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jronen/articles/Journal%20of%20Forensic 
%20Accounting.doc. 
 50 Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud, supra note 10, at A14. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 293.  Given the high degree of industry 
concentration, the authors question the wisdom of the decision to prosecute Arthur 
Andersen for obstruction of justice.  Id. at 293–94.  They noted that in 1997, when 
Andersen was still in business, the four-firm concentration ratio for public company 
auditing was 71%.  Id. at 294.  This figure rose to 99% in 2002, after Andersen’s 
demise.  Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON 
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 105, available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
03-864 [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. 
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Four audit 97%.55  The GAO report concluded that there are “no 
significant competitors” for large-company auditing.56 
In other words, though big corporations depend on the Big 
Four for auditing, the Big Four do not depend on their auditing 
business, the importance of which to accounting firms has 
diminished relative to other services.  The flat-fee audit pricing 
increasingly popular in the 1970s and 1980s drove down what 
accounting firms could earn from auditing.  There is some evidence 
that the perceived need to keep audit costs down resulted in lower 
quality auditing, particularly as big firms turned to “risk-based” 
auditing in which auditors focus on what they anticipated would be 
problem areas, and relied more on management’s data for 
presumably low-error areas like cash on the balance sheet.  If the 
auditor’s initial risk assessment is wrong, however, significant 
problems may be missed.57 
Another threat to audit quality came from the other services 
offered by accounting firms.  Why should this be so?  With auditing 
less profitable, firms turned to other sources of revenue.  They built 
up their consulting businesses, offering clients numerous other 
services, including outsourcing internal audit work, tax accounting, 
and designing computerized financial information systems.58  
Whereas in 1981, fees for management advisory services and similar 
services provided thirteen percent of revenue for the Big Five 
accounting firms, by 2000, they provided some fifty percent of 
revenue.59 
By 2002, according to one study, companies paid their 
accounting firms an average of three times for non-audit services 
what they paid the same firm for audit services.60  Given this 
distribution of revenue, the income and career prospects of 
 
 55 Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 293. 
 56 GAO STUDY, supra note 54, at 21. 
 57 Jonathan Weil, Fannie Paid Little for Its Audits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2004, at C1, 
C3 (describing “risk-based auditing,” in which auditors give only a cursory review to 
areas of accounting perceived to have little danger of fraud or error, such as cash on 
the balance sheet). 
 58 Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud, supra note 10, at A14. 
 59 See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 
Fed. Reg. 43,148 & 43,153 n.49 (July 12, 2000) (proposing rules subsequently 
codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01 & 240.14a-101); Mark Allan Worden, Securities 
Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence from Non-Audit Services—An Evolving 
Standard, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (2002). 
 60 Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1411. 
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accountants working in auditing came to depend less on their 
reputations for high-quality auditing and more on their billings.61 
Furthermore, an unintended regulatory consequence of the 
growth of non-auditing business was to hand audit clients a powerful 
weapon.  As noted, the original regulatory scheme protected auditor 
independence by requiring disclosure whenever a change in auditor 
occurred.62  Thus, if an auditor insisted that financial statements be 
changed before signing off on them, a corporation would probably 
listen because if not, the audit firm would publicly resign as auditor.  
With the growth of consulting services, however, corporations no 
longer had to either adhere to the auditor’s recommendations or 
explain why the auditor resigned.  Instead, they had a third choice—
to threaten to stop buying lucrative non-audit services from the 
auditor’s firm.  Such a threat had teeth since it could be carried out 
in secret.  Changes in non-audit service providers did not need to be 
revealed.63  In June 2000, the SEC tried to address this problem by 
substantially restricting the ability of accounting firms to perform 
non-audit services for a client while the firm was, at the same time, 
auditing its financial statements for public disclosure.  The proposed 
rule, however, weakened after a “bruising battle” with accounting 
firms and corporations.64 
Regulatory action or private lawsuits could have 
counterbalanced the increased pressures for auditors to simply 
certify, rather than scrutinize, their clients’ financial information.  
Both of these external monitors, however, lost power.  The SEC failed 
to keep up with the changing economy in terms of its institutional 
capacity.  Between 1991 and 2000, financial statements and other 
corporate filings increased by nearly 60%, but the SEC’s staff 
available to review them grew by only 29% and its legal and 
investigative staff by 16%.65  In another measure, annual volume of 
 
 61 Id. at 1415. 
 62 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 63 Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237–38 
(2002). 
 64 The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the Gatekeepers Remain 
Silent?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 107th Cong. 
3 (2001) (testimony of Prof. John C. Coffee, Jr., et al.), available at http://commerce. 
senate.gov/hearings/121801Coffee.pdf [hereinafter Enron Hearings]. 
 65 Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and 
the District of Columbia, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 3–4 (2002) 
(statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community 
Investments, and Loren Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade, U.S. 
  
1048 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1029 
trading on exchanges increased almost six-fold from 1993 to 2001, 
while the SEC’s enforcement staff grew by only 15%.66  The SEC 
exercised its power to suspend trading of shares only ten to twenty 
times per year over the last decade.67  Some commentators have 
linked this lax enforcement to Enron and associated scandals.68 
Liability rules also weakened private investors’ ability to serve as 
monitors of corporate auditing.  It became harder to recover 
damages from the auditors themselves after 1994 when the Supreme 
Court held that auditors could not be held liable, under the 
Securities Acts, for aiding and abetting.69  That is, auditors are not 
liable simply for failing to stop a corporation from making a 
misstatement.  Instead, auditors themselves must affirmatively do 
something that causes investors harm.  What constitutes such 
affirmative action tends to vary.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has held that auditors may be liable if they 
maintained a “significant role” in drafting or editing a misleading 
document.70  In contrast, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have 
imposed auditor liability only if the misleading statement was publicly 
attributable to the auditor at the time the injured party decided to 
invest.71 
Changes in the level of liability that corporations potentially 
incur for issuing misleading disclosures may have made them less 
likely to insist on the sort of careful auditing that decreases their 
exposure.  As a matter of Delaware corporate law, directors have a 
fiduciary duty to see that accurate financial information is disclosed 
to shareholders.72  Likewise, under federal securities law, a 
 
General Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d02662t.pdf. 
 66 Mark Schroeder, SEC Gets a Raise, But Will It Be Enough?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 
2002, at C1. 
 67 Suspensions are reported at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2005). 
 68 See Enron Hearings, supra note 64, at 3–4; Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the 
Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 181–83 (2002); 
see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 290 (2004). 
 69 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 70 Dannenberg v. PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 
50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub. nom. Montgomery Sec. v. 
Dannenberg, 516 U.S. 907 (1995). 
 71 Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright v. 
Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 
(1999). 
 72 Anglo American Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Int’l Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143, 
157 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Under Delaware law, fiduciaries are required, at the very least, 
  
2005 AUDITING REGULATION 1049 
corporation is liable for damages if its financial disclosure is defective, 
and third parties can prove that, in making a securities sale or 
purchase, they relied on the disclosure to their detriment.73  These 
cases became harder to bring and prove in the 1990s.  The Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)74 limits attorneys’ 
fees recoverable in class action litigation.75  It also increases the level 
of information that claimants must acquire prior to bringing suit by 
requiring claimants to plead the details of suspected fraud with 
particularity in the initial complaint, rather than allowing claimants 
to plead them generally and flesh them out later with facts learned 
during pre-trial disclosure.76  Discovery is now postponed until after a 
court has determined whether the case may go forward.77  In 1998, 
Congress imposed similar limitations on such cases proceeding in 
state courts.78  Although some studies show that the number of 
lawsuits and the average size of settlements increased through 2002,79 
other commentators believe that limits on liability have made 
misleading financial disclosure more likely.80 
The upshot of all these changes was to give auditors more 
incentives to see their job as one of certification auditing.  The 
auditor–client relationship in certification auditing gives the auditor 
reasons to favor the interest of the client, not the third party 
information user (in this case, the public).  As discussed above in 
Parts I.A.3 and I.B.3, studies have identified a number of relevant 
biases: Auditors are prone to approve accounts prepared by managers 
even if they would have done them differently themselves (the 
“approval” bias) and are prone to identify with their clients’ interest 
(“attachment” bias).  With the growth of accounting firms and their 
consulting income, the “self-serving” bias81 came to the fore.  The 
individual auditor in a large firm can have a personal interest in 
 
to be honest and truthful when communicating with their principals.” (citing Malone 
v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10–11 (Del. 1998)). 
 73 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R.  
§ 240.10b-5. 
 74 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended by the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 75 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000). 
 76 Id. 
 77 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 78 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f). 
 79 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 33 n.216 (2002). 
 80 William Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions 
by Corporate Insiders—The Rise of a New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 
77–80 (2002). 
 81 See Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, supra note 15, at 428. 
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keeping a client happy, so that the firm can retain both the audit and 
the substantial non-auditing business. 
Non-audit services also change the auditor’s psychological work 
environment.  If an accounting firm’s only connection with a 
company is the audit, the external auditor’s relations with corporate 
employees may be somewhat distant and formal even if corporate 
headquarters pays the audit fee.  This formality can erode if the same 
auditors come back year after year, which is a reason to require 
auditors and audit firms to rotate.  When the accounting firm also 
does non-audit work, however, the firm and the corporate employees 
are on the same “team,” working together for the good of the 
corporation.  Auditors may find this “team” mentality hard to ignore. 
B. The Trap of Flexible Accounting Standards 
Accounting standards are vital to certification auditing because 
the third party information user needs some way to evaluate the 
information received.  They are particularly important in securities 
disclosure auditing.  A large number of investors use financial 
information to assess a multitude of investment opportunities.  These 
investors need to know they are comparing apples to apples.  This 
calls for clear, firm standards.  Given the complexity of modern 
corporations, however, accounting standards must contain sufficient 
flexibility to cover a variety of circumstances. 
Historically, standard-setting in securities financial disclosure 
auditing took the same path as standard-setting in regulatory 
certification auditing.  The 1934 Securities Exchange Act authorized 
the SEC, as the representative of the public, to set accounting 
standards,82 though it did not direct the agency to do so.  The SEC, in 
fact, has never set accounting standards.  Instead, it followed the lead 
of the street railway regulators and deferred to standards set by 
accountants.  Thus, in 1938, the SEC issued an “Accounting Series 
Release” directing that financial disclosure statements should follow 
accounting principles that have “substantial authoritative support.”83  
The SEC now recognizes the GAAP standards issued by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) as having such support.84 
If the regulatory structure has given auditors the incentives to 
favor their clients with deferential certification auditing, then the 
 
 82 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 83 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 945 (2003) [hereinafter Cunningham, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn]. 
 84 See, e.g., Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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accounting standards have provided the means.  There are two ways 
in which the system is susceptible to influence.  The first is in the way 
the rules are made.  Before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, FASB, the 
standard-setter, received half of its funding from the large accounting 
firms.  Studies suggest that accounting firms tried to influence the 
timing and content of accounting standards in ways that favored their 
clients.85  For instance, because of the development of new financial 
vehicles and business forms, it was important in the 1990s for FASB to 
be able to move quickly in establishing new standards.  FASB 
politicking, however, sometimes delayed this.  Notoriously, the 
extremely important FASB standard for accounting for derivatives 
was debated and delayed for four years.86  Sarbanes-Oxley addresses 
these abuses.  It requires that FASB (or any successor) be funded 
solely by corporations’ audit support fees or risk losing recognition as 
a private standard-setter.87  Further, FASB board members cannot 
belong to accounting firms while they are serving on the board or for 
the preceding two years.88  Finally, FASB must “promptly” consider 
rule changes through majority vote.89 
The second problem with GAAP is more intractable.  Given the 
extreme complexity of the underlying economic activity, standards 
maintain significant flexibility.90  Consequently, if a variety of 
psychological and economic factors provide managers with the 
 
 85 Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 205 & n.410; see also 
ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICAN 
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 111–15 (2002). 
 86 CONFERENCE BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 41 (2003), available at 
http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/757.pdf. 
 87 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7218(b) (Supp. II 2002). 
 88 15 U.S.C. § 7218(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 89 15 U.S.C. § 7218(b)(1)(A)(iv). 
 90 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in 
Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002) [hereinafter Cunningham, Sharing 
Accounting’s Burden].  Cunningham states: 
Untutored lawyers sometimes face arguments from seasoned 
counterparts that a position is necessary or desirable because it accords 
with GAAP.  The unwashed may find this stance convincing, but it 
invariably is not.  GAAP’s conventions authorize a wide variety of 
treatments for identical economic events, from relatively standard 
contexts such as inventory and depreciation to more challenging 
contexts such as derivatives and leases.  Accounting requires choices 
and judgments entailing substantial subjectivity, making compliance 
with GAAP insufficient.  It rarely mandates particular treatments and 
by no means forecloses massaging numbers, or even committing fraud.  
Seasoned advocates working with accounting data know this about 
GAAP. 
Id. at 1435. 
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motivation to distort financial reports and auditors with the 
motivation to approve those reports, then the flexible accounting 
standards may not stand in the way. 
Recall that when an auditor certifies a financial statement, he or 
she is really saying that it “present[s] fairly, in all material respects, 
the financial position of [X Corporation] . . . in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles.”91  This formulation is 
already somewhat ambiguous: It does not simply aver that the 
statements are a fair picture but rather that they are a fair picture 
according to GAAP.  Taken as a formal system, GAAP has seven broad 
principles at its core that certainly require fair reporting.  But in an 
effort to provide predictability and comparability among reports, 
these principles have become the center of a web of more than 140 
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards and thousands of 
Interpretations and Technical Bulletins.92  The resulting system is not 
only complex, but provides numerous ways to account for even 
common items such as inventory and depreciation as well as exotic 
ones such as derivatives.93 
Additionally, while GAAP was designed to be responsive to the 
actual needs of auditors, accountants, and companies, it also has the 
capacity to cause a race to the bottom when it comes to quality of 
disclosure.  It invites companies to follow each other’s lead, rather 
than adhere to some fixed standard.  “GAAP” stands for “Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles.”  For example, if common practice is 
to fail to disclose executive stock options as a future contingent 
liability, why should a company put itself at a competitive 
disadvantage by being one of a minority that does disclose?94 
 
 91 Prohs, supra note 6, at 493 & n.108. 
 92 The California Supreme Court has called GAAP 
an amalgam of statements issued by the AICPA through the successive 
groups it has established to promulgate accounting principles: the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure, the Accounting Principles 
Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. . . .  GAAP 
include broad statements of accounting principles amounting to 
aspirational norms as well as more specific guidelines and illustrations.  
The lack of an official compilation allows for some debate of whether 
particular announcements are encompassed within GAAP. . . .  One 
standard book purporting to comprehensively restate GAAP includes 
90 major sections and more than 500 pages. 
Biley v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750–51 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 93 Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden, supra note 90, at 1435. 
 94 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Case for Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at 
A13 (“[T]he standards defining acceptable accounting judgments depend on 
context.  When almost all companies issue optimistic earnings reports, such reports 
come to be viewed as normal.  Even the most cautious executives then feel pressure 
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The upshot of this is that managers can tell their financial story 
in a favorable way and auditors can legitimately defer to it because of 
the many different treatments supported by GAAP.  Managers of 
some corporations that crashed in the 1990s were simply mistaken in 
their optimistic projections about things like the value of leases or 
accounts receivable; as discussed above in Part II.A.2, these 
information-based assets are hard to value.  Other managers, 
however, engaged in “creative compliance,” in that they followed 
GAAP formally while in fact evading the duties that the rules, taken as 
a whole, impose.95  An Enron company manual was explicit in 
preferring technical compliance with GAAP to reporting of economic 
reality: “Reported earnings follow the rules and principles of 
accounting.  The results do not always create measures consistent 
with underlying economics.  However, corporate management’s 
performance is generally measured by accounting income, not 
underlying economics.  Risk management strategies are therefore directed at 
accounting rather than economic performance.”96 
To cite just one example, GAAP rules allow use of the off-
balance-sheet Special Purpose Entities (“SPE”) as long as three 
percent of the ownership is not in the parent corporation.  Enron 
employed this device misleadingly to transfer debt off its balance 
sheet via some three thousand SPEs.97  This sort of thing suggests that 
far from serving the needs of the third party information users (the 
public), the accounting standards sometimes positively disserved the 
public by making deception easier. 
C. What Recent Scandals Tell Us About the Divergent Role of Auditors 
As discussed in Parts II.A.2 and II.B, by the late 1990s, several 
factors were in place that increased the risk that companies would 
promulgate misleading financial disclosure: complex information-
based businesses, consolidation in the accounting profession, 
 
to report their earnings even more optimistically, in turn creating room for their 
more aggressive counterparts to push the envelope further.”). 
 95 Doreen McBarnet & C.J. Whelan, Creative Compliance and the Defeat of Legal 
Control: The Magic of the Orphan Subsidiary, in THE HUMAN FACE OF LAW 179, 183–93 
(Keith Hawkins ed., 1997). 
 96 Enron Corp. Risk Management Manual, quoted in Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist 
View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1248–49 & n.15 
(2003) (emphasis added). 
 97 See Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1404 & n.4; see also Partnoy, 
supra note 96 (arguing that financial derivatives, “such as options, futures and other 
contracts whose value is linked to some underlying financial instrument or index” 
were more important to Enron’s collapse than were transactions with Special 
Purpose Entities). 
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conflicts of interest within accounting firms between auditing and 
non-audit consulting services, a weakened SEC, increased protection 
of auditors and their clients from liability for misleading financial 
disclosure, and finally, flexible accounting standards that gave room 
for bias to operate.  At the same time, stock prices seemed to be 
going only up during the late 1990s; it was tempting to think that the 
New Economy did not follow the old business rules, such as the need 
to link profits and high share prices.  This bubble burst in spring 
2000. 
Was misleading financial disclosure to blame for the bubble and 
the collapse?  If what fuelled the long stock market rise of the 1990s 
was the “irrational exuberance” of investors willing—if not rushing—
to speculate, then no amount of good financial information could 
have helped.  Investors would have ignored it.98  On the other hand, it 
is undisputed that many corporations did disclose financial 
statements inflated by creative accounting, and it is commonly held 
that these induced some amount of investment.  The former chief 
accountant of the SEC estimated that between 1995 and 2001, faulty 
audits cost investors some $100 billion.99 
Though investors may have brought some of their woes upon 
themselves, it also seems clear that they failed to receive “watch-dog” 
protection from auditors.  In many instances, auditors’ certifications 
were not a sign of quality financial disclosure.  One indication of this 
is the large number of times corporations restated their disclosed 
financial statements after the discovery of accounting irregularities.  
For example, a key event in the collapse of Enron was the fall 2001 
restatement of net income relating back to 1997, a $586 million 
reduction.100  According to a report by the GAO, there were 92 
restatements in 1997, more than doubling to 225 by 2001.101  
Furthermore, not just small or new companies issued financial 
restatements, but large, established ones did so as well.  In 1997, the 
average market capitalization of a company issuing a restatement was 
$500 million.  By 2001, it had risen to $2 billion.102 
Notably, some of the most scandal-ridden corporations, Enron, 
Global Crossing, Qwest, and WorldCom, all used the large and 
respected firm of Arthur Andersen as outside auditor.  At WorldCom, 
 
 98 Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1412. 
 99 Jane Mayer, The Accountants’ War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 22, 2002, at 64, 68. 
 100 LEVITT, supra note 85, at 141. 
 101 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET 
IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 4, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf (Oct. 2002). 
 102 Id. at 17. 
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Andersen failed to report that management foiled an internal control 
system and recorded expenses as assets.  At Qwest, it approved 
reports reflecting cash “earned” from swaps of telephone capacity 
that involved no cash.103  Andersen’s eventually fatal problem was that 
its Houston office was entwined with Enron, which provided some 
twenty-seven percent of that office’s public client audit fees.104  At one 
point, one hundred Andersen employees worked in leased space at 
Enron headquarters.105  Andersen consultants developed the 
computer system that generated the information Andersen auditors 
would review.  Enron’s president, vice president, and chief 
accounting officer were all former Andersen employees.106 
The decline and precipitous fall of Enron is well known.  In 
2000, it was the seventh largest company in the United States, with 
share prices reaching $90.56.  The prices began to plummet in 2001 
amid revelations that Enron created paper profits through 
transactions with its many SPEs.  Enron restated its financial 
statements; share prices fell further.  In December 2001, it entered 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.  By January 2002, its shares, 
many held by employees, traded at 36 cents.107  The collapse led to a 
government investigation of Enron, during which Andersen 
personnel destroyed key documents.108  Andersen was convicted of 
felony obstruction of justice in June 2002 and dissolved, a disgraceful 
end to the 89-year-old firm.109 
Andersen certainly had accountants who were skilled detectives, 
yet the firm nonetheless certified Enron’s aggressive accounting.  For 
instance, Andersen’s professional standards group partner reviewing 
the Enron audit complained about the improper recording of some 
$150 million in connection with a transaction and commented that 
“this whole deal looks like there is no substance.” 110  He was, however, 
 
 103 Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 83, at 932–34. 
 104 Krishna G. Palepu & Paul M. Healy, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
3, 15 (2003). 
 105 FOX, supra note 1, at 212. 
 106 Mayer, supra note 99, at 66. 
 107 Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DUQ. 
L. REV. 69, 146 (2002); see also FOX, supra note 1, at xiii, 2; Ribstein, supra note 79, at 
5–6. 
 108 Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 83, at 929. 
 109 FOX, supra note 1, at xiii, 181, 303; see Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from 
Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917 (2003) (discussing criminal prosecution of Andersen 
and the firm’s response). 
 110 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 679 
(S.D. Tex. 2002). 
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removed from his position.111  In the securities class action suit filed in 
the wake of Enron’s collapse, the court concluded that “[a] number 
of surviving Arthur Andersen documents reveal that Arthur Andersen 
was concerned about, yet covered up or ignored fraudulent 
accounting practices by Enron.”112 
D. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Moderate Reforms 
Public outrage at Enron and its sister scandals created unusual 
political interest in the arcane area of corporate financial 
disclosure,113 resulting in speedy passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 in July 2002.114  Particular reforms important to auditing fall into 
four basic categories: oversight of auditors, enhanced enforcement, 
auditor independence, and supervision of the audit.  Under the Act, 
however, corporations still engage their own auditors.  As this section 
will discuss, Sarbanes-Oxley improved the current situation, but the 
basic mis-incentives built into the relationships among the auditor, 
the audit client, and the public require more radical reform. 
1. Increased Public Oversight of Auditing 
Sarbanes-Oxley establishes the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), the first quasi-federal body to become 
involved in professional discipline and regulations of auditors and 
the promulgation of auditing standards, which were previously left to 
the states and to professional self-regulation.  PCAOB is a non-
governmental body with five full-time members appointed by the 
SEC,115 only two of whom may be certified public accountants.116  Its 
funding comes from an annual “Accounting Support Fee” paid by 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes, the Senate sponsor of the legislation, recalled 
that much of the testimony taken by the Senate Banking Committee in early 2002 on 
corporate financial disclosure was highly technical.  One member, he said, did not 
realize that there was an open microphone in the vicinity when he confided, “This is 
really boring,” to Wyoming Senator Mike Enzi.  Senator Enzi, the body’s only 
Certified Public Accountant, replied, “It may be boring to you, but I haven’t had this 
much fun since I came to the United States Senate.”  AM. LAW INST., REMARKS AND 
ADDRESSES AT THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING 48, 53–54 (2004). 
 114 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 83, 
at 917 & n.2. 
 115 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a) (establishment), § 101(b) (status) & § 101(e) 
(membership), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a), (b), and (e).  The SEC selects PCAOB board 
members “after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury.”  15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4). 
 116 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2). 
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corporations.117  Among PCAOB’s duties is the duty to conduct 
periodic inspections of audit firms (once a year for large firms).  
Firms may incur fines or lose the right to audit public disclosure 
statements if they violate either the law or the PCAOB’s auditing 
standards and independence rules.118 
Can PCAOB provide better auditing?  Early indications are 
good; evidence suggests that it may be expected to act vigorously.  For 
example, although the PCAOB was initially dubbed “peekaboo,”119 
and its first chairman nominee withdrew after revelations that he 
served on the audit committee of a company charged with mail, wire, 
and securities fraud,120 its chief auditor is a former standards writer 
with a reputation for strictness.121  PCAOB also broke with the past in 
its approach to standard-setting.  Congress gave it the option of 
delegating auditing and quality control standard-setting to a private 
organization (just as the SEC has delegated accounting standard-
setting to FASB).122  PCAOB, however, determined to set its own 
auditing standards.123  PCAOB oversight was linked to some twenty-
 
 117 15 U.S.C. § 7219(d)(1). 
 118 15 U.S.C. §§ 7212, 7214, 7215. 
 119 Judith Burns, Accounting Board Tackles Its Mission Amid Initial Laughs: PCAOB, 
Known as Peekaboo to Some, Has Oversight of a Troubled Industry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003, 
at C5. 
 120 John Yozzo, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disaster: You Can’t 
Make This Stuff Up!,  AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 30, 30. 
 121 J.D. Glater, Eager to Be the Auditors’ Auditor, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003; Jerry 
Ascierto, New World Order: As the PCAOB Takes Shape, the AICPA’s Role Is Blurred, 
CALIFORNIA CPA, June 2003, at 6, available at http://www.findarticles.com (“Douglas 
Carmichael, the board’s chief auditor, is an outspoken critic of the AICPA, as well as 
the big auditing firms.  Carmichael, an accounting professor at Baruch College, once 
served as vice president of auditing for the AICPA where he helped develop auditing 
standards in the early 1980s.”). 
 122 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)(A)(i) (providing that PCAOB may adopt as auditing, 
quality control, and ethics standards “any portion of any statement of auditing 
standards or other professional standards . . . that were proposed by [one] or more 
professional groups of accountants . . . .”). 
 123 William J. McDonough, The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities & Financial Law, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583, 596 (2004).  In the 
words of PCAOB chairman McDonough: 
the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act gave the Board the power to designate or 
recognize any professional group of accountants to propose new 
standards.  However, before I arrived in June, my fellow Board 
members determined not to exercise the authority to delegate, but 
instead voted to set the standards from within the PCAOB.  It was a 
decision I heartily endorse and clearly was consistent with the intent of 
Congress.  As all of you know, in understanding any act of Congress 
you have to go look at the legislative history and find out what they 
really wanted in addition to what they wound up putting on paper.  As 
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five financial restatements in 2004.  Debt classification problems on 
one company’s financials prompted examiners to revisit others, in 
turn prompting those companies to disclose corrected information.124  
PCAOB oversight, however, in no way changes the incentive structure 
of securities disclosure auditing because auditors still work for the 
audited corporation.  The new oversight gives accounting firms 
reason to obey its rules to avoid trouble themselves, but the 
countervailing incentive to do an audit favorable to the audit client 
remains. 
2. Enhanced Penalties and Enforcement 
Additionally, Sarbanes-Oxley increases the threat of legal 
enforcement.  The SEC now has more muscle—the Act provided a 
sixty-three percent increase in funding, including some $98 million 
to hire two hundred staff members to oversee auditing.  The Agency 
now must review disclosure filings systematically and at least once 
every three years per corporation.125  Private liability rules remain 
essentially unchanged, but fines or civil fraud liability connected to a 
securities purchase or sale can no longer be discharged in 
bankruptcy.126  The securities fraud limitations period has been 
extended,127 though Congress resisted calls to repeal the PSLRA, 
which, as discussed in Part II.A.2, continues to set a very high 
standard for bringing a securities fraud case.  Corporate managers 
will face increased liability themselves for misleading disclosure.  
Chief executive officers and chief financial officers must now certify 
personally that their corporation’s disclosed financial reports not 
only comply with securities law but “fairly present[ ], in all material 
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the 
issuer.”128  A violation can result in a maximum fine of $1 million and 
 
sometimes happen [sic], we had that option, but we shouldn’t have 
used it, and we didn’t.   
Id. 
 124 Diya Gullapalli, To Err Is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine: Companies Redo 
Reports in Record Numbers, Partly Due to Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at C3 
[hereinafter Gullapalli, To Err is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine]. 
 125 15 U.S.C. § 78kk. 
 126 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). 
 127 The statute of limitations for securities fraud claims was extended from one to 
two years after discovery and a maximum of five years (formerly three years) after the 
violation.  28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).  The earlier limitations period was announced by the 
Supreme Court in Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (uniform limitations 
period for private securities actions). 
 128 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b). 
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up to ten years in prison, or $5 million and twenty years if the 
wrongful certification is “willful.”129 
Will these penalties and enhanced SEC oversight change 
corporation’s incentives, so that they demand that their auditors 
ensure that financial disclosure is not misleading?  It is too soon to 
tell.  The requirement that CEOs and CFOs certify financial 
disclosure was generally effective in November 2004 and has been 
linked to a record number of restatements correcting errors in 
financial statements.130  On the other hand, the SEC’s level of 
commitment to aggressive enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley may vary.131  
And, as for the deterrence effect of harsh penalties, it bears 
remembering that mail, wire, and securities fraud statutes already 
provided significant penalties and prison time at the time of the 
scandals, but did not serve as a deterrent to managers at corporations 
such as Enron and WorldCom.132 
3. Stricter Independence Rules—With a Loophole 
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley significantly strengthens the rules 
encouraging the independence of auditors from their clients.  It 
makes clear that an accounting firm auditing a corporation may not 
also keep the corporation’s books, do its accounting, prepare its 
financial statements, or design or implement financial information 
systems.  It may not conduct appraisals or valuations for the 
corporation, perform actuarial services, help outsource the internal 
audit, recruit personnel, or provide a variety of services, including 
legal or investment advice, investment banking, or brokerage or 
expert consultation.133 
Can these rules remove any incentives an accounting firm might 
have to soft-peddle an audit report in order to keep consulting 
business?  Perhaps not.  The prohibitions are not hard and fast.  
Although PCAOB may prohibit additional services by regulation,134 it 
may also exempt any accounting firm, public company, or even a 
particular transaction from the independence rules “on a case by case 
 
 129 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c). 
 130 Gullapalli, To Err is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine, supra note 124, at C3. 
 131 The SEC has been charged with being both too aggressive in enforcement and 
too easy on business interests.  See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, SEC’s Top Accountant Counts on 
Not Pleasing Everyone, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2005, at C1, C3; Deborah Solomon, Tough 
Tack of SEC Chief Could Relent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at C1, C5. 
 132 See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal 
Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937 (2003). 
 133 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g). 
 134 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(9). 
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basis.”135  More importantly, the audit committee of the issuer’s board 
of directors can also grant exceptions from the rules.  A variety of 
non-audit work is permissible with the committee’s approval—or 
even the approval of a single delegated committee member.136  
Among the non-audit services an audit committee may approve are 
tax services.  The problem is that tax services and auditing are a bad 
mix.  The tax accountant is an advocate.  In performing tax services, 
an accounting firm’s specific task is to advance its client’s interests, as 
the Supreme Court has recognized: 
The filing of a corporate tax return entails much more than 
filling in the blanks on an IRS form in accordance with 
undisputed tax principles; more likely than not, the return is a 
composite interpretation of corporate transactions made by 
corporate officers in the light most favorable to the taxpayer.137 
The auditor, in contrast, plays an essentially judicial role.138  Sarbanes-
Oxley, however, allows a single accounting firm to wear both hats: 
advancing the corporation’s interests on the tax side, while giving its 
financial disclosure statements a disinterested review on the audit 
side.  It is not difficult to imagine that a firm in such a position would 
tend to see itself more as a certifier of its client’s financial disclosure 
than as a vigorous watchdog for the public. 
The Act does require that, if the audit committee allows an 
accounting firm doing  the audit to also perform non-audit services, 
this must be disclosed in the corporation’s regular periodic public 
report.139  In theory, disclosure should act as a check on abuse.  
Auditors would exercise caution to do a good audit knowing that 
their potential conflict of interest would be made public.  Investors 
who learned that a corporation conducted additional business with its 
auditing firm would pay less per share due to the increased risk that 
the auditor’s interest in continued business made the audit less 
 
 135 15 U.S.C. § 7231. The exceptions to the independence rules are allowed “to 
the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and 
is consistent with the protection of investors . . . .”  Id. 
 136 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) (exemption); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(B)(3) (delegation). 
 137 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815 (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
 138 Recognizing the quasi-judicial role of the auditor, the Supreme Court noted 
that an auditor’s review of a tax return could be helpful in an IRS investigation: “It is 
difficult to say that the assessment by the independent auditor of the correctness of 
positions taken by the taxpayer in his return would not throw ‘light upon’ the 
correctness of the return.”  Id. 
 139 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(2) (“Approval by an audit committee . . . of a non-audit 
service to be performed by the auditor of the issuer shall be disclosed to investors in 
periodic reports required by section 13(a).”). 
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reliable.  Because share prices would reflect the possibility of bias, 
there would be no need to regulate further. 
One study, however, suggests that disclosure would not lead to 
investor caution.  Disturbingly, disclosure might even make things 
worse by cutting down on auditors’ self-monitoring.140  In this 
experiment, several jars were filled with coins.  Study participants 
were assigned to pairs.  One member of the pair was given the 
responsibility of estimating the amount of money in the jars, but 
could only observe the jars from a distance.  The other member of 
the pair played the role of advisor and could study the jars up close.  
The “advisor,” however, was not paid according to how accurate the 
estimator guessed the number of coins, but rather according to how 
high the estimator guessed.  This gave the advisor every incentive to 
report a misleadingly large coin count.  This pay arrangement was 
disclosed to the estimators in half of the pairs and kept secret from 
the other half.  In the half where there was full disclosure, the 
estimators, nevertheless, fully considered the advice they were 
receiving despite knowing that the advisors had a reason to mislead 
them.  Furthermore, the advisors felt freer to report even more 
inaccurate estimates than they had before, presumably because they 
assumed that the estimators would discount them.141  If this study 
predicts auditor and investor behavior, it calls into question the idea 
that disclosure can cure the conflict that arises from simultaneously 
performing auditing and non-auditing services. 
4. Supervision by the Audit Committee: A Return to 
“Detective Auditing”? 
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley reaches inside the corporate structure of 
the audited corporation to make the audit committee of the audited 
corporation’s board of directors responsible for overseeing the audit.  
The executives responsible for preparing the books can no longer be 
the same people who select and supervise the auditors that review 
and assess them.  Now, the audit committee must preapprove 
contracts for auditing and any non-audit services,142 resolve disputes 
between auditors and management,143 and establish a confidential 
anonymous procedure for employees to report questionable 
accounting procedures.144  The audit committee must consist of 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(1)(A). 
 143 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1. 
 144 See id. 
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independent directors (not company executives) and possess the 
authority and funding to hire its own lawyers and advisors.145  If audit 
committee members do not supervise the audit properly, a 
corporation could lose its ability to trade on a regulated exchange.146 
This, for our purposes, is Sarbanes-Oxley’s most far-reaching 
reform of auditing, because it has the possibility of actually changing 
the incentive structure.  Earlier, I discussed two different auditor–
client relationships.  In detective auditing, discussed in Part I.A.1, the 
auditor works for the information user, namely, the owner of the 
resources used in the business, who wants a candid assessment of the 
actions of the managers.  In certification auditing, discussed in Part 
I.B.1, the auditor works for the corporation as a whole, which is 
disclosing information to a third party information user.  Securities 
disclosure auditing shares the structure of certification auditing: the 
auditor works for the corporation that discloses financial reports to 
the third party information user, namely, the public.  This sits 
uncomfortably with the regulatory purpose, which is to give the 
public good information.  That purpose suggests that auditors should 
work for the public, not the corporation. 
Another way to look at securities financial disclosure, however, is 
not as disclosure to the amorphous “public,” but as disclosure to the 
owners of the corporation who are so numerous and dispersed that 
public disclosure is the only practical way to reach them.147  Seen in 
this light, an auditing committee of independent directors is a logical 
principal for the auditor.  It represents the shareholders, who are the 
owners of the corporation.  Like any owner, the committee would 
seek a report from the auditor on what its agents (i.e. management) 
have been doing with its invested resources.  Ideally, having the audit 
committee in charge would recreate the medieval alignment of roles 
among the detective auditor, the auditor’s employer (the lord of the 
manor), and the subject of the audit.  With the audit committee as 
the representative of the shareholders, the business “owner” would be 
the principal hiring the detective auditor.  Its goal: a candid report 
on the doings of management. 
 
 145 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(3) (independence); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(5) 
(authority to engage advisors), § 78f(m)(6) (funding). 
 146 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A). 
 147 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement 
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 413, 414 (2004) 
[hereinafter Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers] (“A partial solution to corporate 
structure’s separation of ownership from control requires managers to report the 
corporation’s condition and performance to investors, using a generally recognized 
accounting system and a third-party auditor vouching for the report’s veracity.”). 
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Is the audit committee up to the task?  Faith in the audit 
committee suggests Congress’ endorsement of the view that the job 
of corporate boards of directors is to monitor the company’s 
activities, rather than to focus on other traditional functions such as 
management, advice, and obtaining resources for the company.148  
Independent directors represent the key to the monitoring board.  
Because they are outside the corporation, the theory is that they can 
ensure that it operates in the interest of the shareholders and the 
public, and fulfills its legal responsibilities, including the duty to 
promulgate accurate financial disclosure.  Empirically, the success of 
audit committees in improving auditing has been mixed.  Studies 
show that a company with an audit committee of independent 
directors is less likely to buy potentially compromising non-audit 
services from the audit firm.149  Furthermore, it is more likely, when 
troubled, to disclose a report noting that the company may not 
continue as a going concern and less likely to dismiss the auditor who 
gave the “going concern” qualification.150  On the other hand, these 
committees did not prevent recent abuses.  Enron’s board had 
fourteen independent directors and only two insiders.  Its audit 
committee had a state-of-the-art charter providing direct access to the 
company’s staff and consultants plus the ability to hire its own 
accountants and lawyers.151  Nevertheless, it was not able to head off 
deceptive disclosure. 
For audit committees to ensure good auditing, they need both 
sufficient strength and sufficient motivation.  Both are difficult to 
achieve.  The audit committee, even if it meets every month (which is 
not the rule) cannot participate in corporate affairs to the same 
extent as executives who tend to the corporation’s business full time 
and whose personal fortunes are at stake.  Independent directors are 
part-timers.  Though they may have ultimate oversight of the audit, 
management still has the day-to-day interactions with the auditors 
and negotiates and proposes audit contracts for the committee’s 
approval.  It is an empirical question just how independent the 
independent directors are able to be.  One aspect of the recent 
scandals was influence of independent directors by corporations 
through consulting payments, transactions with directors’ businesses 
 
 148 Gregory S. Rowland, Earnings Management, the SEC and Corporate Governance: 
Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 179–86 
(2002). 
 149 ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 19. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Gordon, supra note 63, at 1241. 
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or contributions to favorite charities.152  Sarbanes-Oxley now prohibits 
independent directors from receiving “any consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fee” other than compensation for serving on the 
board.153 
Another fear is that independent directors might identify too 
strongly with managers to monitor them well.  Until recently some 
sixty-three percent of the directors of U.S. public companies were 
chief executive officers of other corporations.154  There exist some 
indications that, in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley’s heightened director 
liability and responsibility, fewer CEOs currently serve on outside 
boards.  In 1997, CEOs of Standard & Poors 500 companies served on 
an average of two outside boards; in 2005, the average decreased to 
0.9 outside boards.155 
Even when audit committee members act in the best of faith to 
promote shareholders’ interests, there is another potential stumbling 
block: what are those interests?  Shareholders have a variety of 
interests.  Some want the sort of long-term corporate credibility that 
scrupulous adherence to law and good disclosure can promote; 
others seek the short-term profit that might be helped by cooking the 
books.156  How the directors should weigh these interests is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  The point is only that, when it comes to 
financial disclosure, it may not be obvious what directors’ fiduciary 
duties require.  If the accounting rules are not crystal clear, and an 
underlying problem is one that a company prefers to keep hidden 
this quarter with the hope of correcting next quarter, directors could 
believe that shareholders are served by less than the most candid 
disclosure. 
 
 152 Enron made significant use of all three of these channels.  See S. REP. NO. 107-
70, at 55 (2002). 
 153 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(3) (Supp. II 2002) 
(“Each member of the audit committee of the issuer [i.e., the audited corporation] 
shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be 
independent.  In order to be considered to be independent . . . a member of an 
audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member 
of the audit committee, the board of directors or any other board committee accept 
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or be an 
affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.”). 
 154 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact?  Some Early Reflections on the Corporations Law 
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1380 (2002). 
 155 Anita Raghavan, More CEOs Say ‘No Thanks’ to Board Seats, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 
2005, at B1, B14. 
 156 See Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 
333, 334, 336–37 (2002). 
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5. Conclusion: Structural Mis-Incentives Remain 
Sarbanes-Oxley creates a number of incentives for actors in the 
current information disclosure system to do a better job.  PCAOB 
oversight may give the Big Four accounting firms reason to perform 
more scrupulous audits, even though the Big Four still retain a 
monopoly over large-company auditing and do not compete with one 
another on the axis of audit quality.  Enhanced penalties for 
managers whose corporations issue misleading disclosures may create 
demand for careful accounting and auditing.  The new 
independence rules, even with their exceptions, should at least 
diminish auditors’ incentives to go easy on an audit in order to 
preserve their firms’ other business ties with the companies being 
audited.  Further, the involvement of the audit committee will 
insulate auditors from direct pressure by the management whose 
accounting is being reviewed. 
Of course, the improvements have potential costs.  Enhanced 
liability and responsibility may scare off good directors.157  
Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley, as some have claimed, may prove 
too costly for small companies.158  The emphasis on independent 
directors may harm corporations if these directors are too risk 
averse,159 or harm the board’s ability to work in a collegial manner at 
its main task of guiding the corporation.160  Too much independence 
could be a problem for auditors as well if it prevents them from 
gaining the informal working knowledge of the corporation that 
improves their grasp of its financial records and their potential 
trouble areas. 
More significantly, Sarbanes-Oxley does not resolve the basic 
schizophrenia in the regulatory structure: Auditors still work for the 
audited corporations, but are supposed to protect the interests of the 
public.  Rules requiring accounting firms to rotate lead audit partners 
 
 157 Raghavan, supra note 155, at B14. 
 158 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 131, at C1, C5. 
 159 Peter J. Wallison, Blame Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at A16 
(arguing that independent directors are too risk averse and that Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
requirement that they have greater influence in corporate governance may be to 
blame for the failure of the economy to rebound despite the aggressive tax cuts, 
deficits, and low interest rates that usually stimulate business growth). 
 160 Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance and Some Thoughts on the 
Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 497–99, 
520 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dhara eds., 2004) (noting that monitoring boards 
are not necessarily better for all corporations because of the possibility of harming 
the board’s ability to manage, work in a collegial manner, and provide resources, 
especially in the case of a start-up corporation). 
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every five years161 and to take a year off after one of their auditors 
becomes a major officer of the audited corporation162 may make it 
harder for the individual auditor to protect his or her friends at the 
client corporation, but this is far from the only problem.  An 
engagement to audit a large public corporation is still a valuable asset 
to an accounting firm.  Though Sarbanes-Oxley takes a step towards 
giving auditors the means and the motive to be public watchdogs, the 
client–auditor relationship remains one in which the auditor is 
“certifying” the client’s financial information.  That alone can give 
auditors a reason to see things from the corporation’s point of view. 
III. ALIGNING AUDITORS’ INCENTIVES WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
ELEMENTS OF REFORM 
As we have seen, from the audited corporation’s viewpoint, 
auditors can act as detectives, providing an honest assessment of a 
financial statement to a client.  Or, they can act as certifiers, 
approving the client’s financial statements before they are disclosed 
to a third party.  Either role on its own makes sense.  If the client 
wants candor, the detective auditor can provide it.  If the client wants 
documents reviewed and certified for a third party, the certification 
auditor can do that.  The problem with U.S. financial disclosure law is 
that while it assumes the auditor will serve as a detective on behalf of 
the public, it puts the auditor in a certification relationship with the 
client. 
It might be objected at this point that this problem is hardly 
unique to auditors.  Many professionals must evaluate the actions of 
their paying clients against an outside, and sometimes unflattering, 
standard.  Lawyers, for instance, often tell clients they cannot lawfully 
do what they want to do.  An appraiser hired to give a valuation is 
expected to use professional judgment, though the result might 
disappoint the property owner.  Teachers must grade students, 
inevitably displeasing the half of the class that cannot be above 
average.  The common thread is that the professional is supposed to 
make an evaluation that furthers a social goal and potentially furthers 
the client’s long-term interests, but that may run contrary to the 
client’s current desires or short-term interests.  For instance, an 
aggressive tax shelter violates the long-term social interest in 
equitable taxation according to law and may harm a client long-term 
if it faces a tax audit.  On the other hand, it may be a great immediate 
 
 161 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (Supp. II 2002). 
 162 The officers are chief executive, chief financial officer or chief accounting 
officer or equivalent.  15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l). 
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financial benefit to the client.  An undeservedly high grade may 
please a student today, but not advance the student’s long-term goal 
of getting a good education.  The auditing analogue is apparent: 
Approving misleading financial disclosure may temporarily keep 
share price high, a short-term benefit.  However, the duplicity harms 
the social interest in transparency for investors and puts the company 
at risk of collapse in the long term when the truth finally comes out.163 
These observations suggest that auditing is not unique in kind.  
Professionals often must decide how to respond when a client’s 
immediate interests conflict with its long-term interests and with the 
dictates of the law, a larger question beyond the scope of this Article.  
Securities disclosure auditors nevertheless face the problem to a 
greater degree than others.  Many other professionals rely on a 
system of “adversarial” testing to supplement their work.  Their job is 
to advance the client’s position, drawing all legitimate inferences in 
favor of the client, understanding that their conclusions are subject 
to attack by an opponent.  Lawyers, whether in litigation or 
transactions, usually face someone on the other side.  So do other 
“evaluative professionals.”  For example, appraisal reports may be 
tested in court (e.g., in a tax assessment or eminent domain 
proceeding) or presented to a third party (e.g., a bank loan 
department) that can challenge and evaluate them.  These situations 
are like auditing for certification. 
In contrast, public company financial disclosure cannot easily be 
tested by investors, nor is the SEC able to scrutinize every filing.  
Furthermore, what adversarial checks on financial disclosure do exist 
have limited time to take effect.  The market responds to financial 
disclosure within minutes.  Even when a regulator or analyst evaluates 
financial information, the evaluation may come too late to protect 
many investors from loss.  This puts great pressure on the auditor to 
ensure that the disclosure is of good quality in the first place. 
It may be morally legitimate for society to demand that auditors 
be public watchdogs even at the risk of financial loss to themselves 
(e.g., when a client withdraws lucrative business).  That does not 
mean it is wise policy to depend on professional altruism to 
guarantee the quality of corporate financial disclosure.  A better 
approach would provide auditors with incentives to do the sort of job 
the public needs done.  At the very least, they should not have 
incentives to do the opposite.  In my view, mis-incentives will pose a 
threat as long as the auditor’s clients lack the incentive to demand and 
 
 163 For example, Enron’s $586 million restatement of four years’ of net income 
lead to its collapse.  For further discussion see supra Part II.C. 
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pay for good auditing.  Thus, if certification auditing is to remain the 
model, then the law should give clients the motive to seek out 
auditors of known integrity.  Or, if the auditor is to be a detective, he 
or she must work for someone who wants a candid report and will 
share it with the public.  Do alternative regulatory schemes exist that 
will better align the auditor’s and client’s incentives with the public 
interest? 
A. Why Do Some Systems of Regulation by Information Disclosure 
Thrive? 
In assessing the wisdom of changes in any regulatory system, the 
question is, will they help make the system as a whole better able to 
achieve the regulatory goal?  This system approach is, I believe, 
especially important in considering regulation of securities disclosure 
auditing, which can be easy to see as an isolated, narrow topic. 
SEC financial disclosure is best analyzed as one of many 
regulatory regimes that seek to modify behavior not by primary 
directives and prohibitions but by giving actors information to use 
themselves.  These systems are incentive based.  They do not require 
the desired activity to take place.  Rather, they require some actors to 
disclose information in order to induce others to do what is the goal 
of the exercise.  For instance, the regulatory goal of nutrition labeling 
is not that every chocolate-chip muffin bear a terrifying calorie count 
on its label or that every display of oranges tout their high Vitamin C 
content.  The goal is healthier Americans.  The means to the goal is 
information disclosure based on the assumption that people will 
respond rationally to the information by choosing more nutritious 
foods.  To take another example, many states seeking to increase 
hospital safety require hospitals to report medical mistakes, such as 
“foreign objects left in a patient” or “operation on the wrong body 
part,”164 to a state agency.  Thus, these states seek to achieve their goal 
of making hospitals safer by forcing hospitals to identify and confront 
their errors and provide information to regulators.  Minnesota 
recently began naming individual hospitals and disclosing errors to 
the public as well.165  This harnesses a private incentive as a means to 
the regulatory goal.  Hospitals will have an additional reason to avoid 
errors—they might lose patients. 
 
 164 Paul Davies, Minnesota Issues a Hospital Report Card: Tallying of Medical Errors Is 
Intended to Arm Patients and Spur Better Prevention, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at D5. 
 165 Id.; see also Minnesota Department of Health, http://www.health.state.mn.us/ 
patientsafety/index.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2005). 
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Securities regulation is an information disclosure system with the 
goal of promoting wise investment.  The means to effectuating that 
goal is disclosure of financial information about companies because 
there is an assumption that, in the aggregate, investors will 
productively allocate capital if they can correctly assess the risks and 
benefits of the underlying activity.  The job of the auditor is to see 
that the disclosed information is as faithful a reflection of the 
underlying economic activity as possible.  Scholars often focus on the 
information itself, noting, for instance, that it must be useable, 
relevant, and available to its intended beneficiaries when they are 
making decisions.166  This alone is too narrow.  Empirical research 
shows that a good regulatory system must also take account of the 
needs and motives of both the information user and the information 
discloser. 
A Harvard study examined SEC financial disclosure and several 
other disclosure systems: nutrition labeling, reporting of medical 
mistakes, toxic release disclosure, publication of patterns of mortgage 
lending, and disclosure of unions’ financial information.  The goal of 
the study was to see why some disclosure regimes succeeded while 
others degenerated into useless paper exercises.167  Because 
regulation by information disclosure depends on incentives, the study 
found that successful schemes had three characteristics: strong 
demand for the information by information users, a benefit to 
information disclosures from good disclosure, and standards that 
allow information to be understood and compared. 
First, strong intermediaries represent the information users.168  
This corrects an asymmetry of power that might otherwise lead the 
disclosure system to deteriorate.  The costs of disclosure are 
concentrated on the entity providing the information (in our case, 
public corporations), while the benefits are diffused among many 
information users (investors).  Because disclosers tend to be better 
organized than users, they can lobby more effectively for favorable 
rules and enforcement policies.  In successful disclosure schemes, 
users have countervailing force.  They also have organizations 
working on their behalf.  For example, environmental groups use 
data regarding toxic spills, and therefore monitor such data.  Other 
community groups monitor bank lending practices. 
 
 166 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161–64 (1982). 
 167 Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Disclosure 
Policies Sustainable?, (Harvard Univ., John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research 
Working Paper Series, RWP03-039, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=384922. 
 168 Id. at 38–39. 
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In the securities markets, a variety of intermediaries such as 
institutional investors, stock analysts, and stock exchanges are in a 
position to represent investors.  A troubling aspect of the recent 
scandals was that they did not vindicate investors’ interest in good 
financial information.  It was not uncommon for stock analysts, for 
example, to over-recommend shares underwritten by their 
employers’ investment banking divisions.169  A good regulatory system 
must ensure that any entities that represent investors have their own 
reasons to want financial disclosure to be of high quality.  Auditors 
could serve as these strong intermediaries if they had the incentives 
of “detective” auditors. 
Second, information is usable and comprehensible.170  This 
means that the “core metrics” must be (1) relatively simple, (2) 
relatively comparable, and (3) agreed to by the interested parties.  
Nutrition labeling, with its uniform method of presenting fat, 
protein, calories, etc., fits this bill.  GAAP satisfies the third of these 
criteria: all accountants and publicly held corporations use it and 
sophisticated investors are conversant with it.  It is far from simple, 
however, and the extent to which it produces data that are 
comparable among companies is open to debate.  Worse, because 
GAAP permits the same economic activity to be reported in different 
ways, financial statements can appear comparable without actually 
presenting comparable information.  Auditing reform needs to 
change this. 
Third, some information disclosers benefit from the information 
disclosure.171  This is what keeps the system from stagnating.  If some 
entities gain an advantage from transparency and good disclosure, 
they will comply with the disclosure requirements or even exceed 
them.  This will then create pressure for their competitors to follow 
suit in a way that the threat of regulatory enforcement cannot.  For 
instance, when manufacturers were forced to report releases of 
toxins, some voluntarily curtailed their releases, thereby satisfying the 
regulatory goal.  They then benefited from the disclosure 
requirement because it allowed them to brag about their clean 
records, imposing a reputational cost on those who did not stop 
spilling and had to continue to disclose spills.172 
In the securities context, the recent stock market scandals clearly 
imposed high reputational costs on companies like Enron and 
 
 169 Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1412–13. 
 170 Fung et al., supra note 167, at 39. 
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WorldCom on account of their faulty financial disclosure.  
Conversely, there should be a way for good financial disclosure to 
help companies stand out in a good way.  If this were the case, 
certification auditing—in which auditors have an incentive to do what 
their clients want—could be good for the public.  Clients would want 
auditors to ensure that their financial disclosure was first rate.  The 
regulatory challenge here is to create incentives for corporations to 
compete by offering better financial disclosure. 
The following subsections discusses a variety of concrete reform 
proposals in terms of these three criteria.  The first two suggestions 
would turn auditors into strong intermediaries for investors—better 
detectives.  In the first proposal, auditors would work for the 
government, not the audited corporation.  In the second proposal, 
they would be more independent and therefore better able to act as 
public watchdogs.  The next two suggestions concentrate on 
improving the GAAP rules that currently can obscure rather than 
clarify information.  The third proposal is “enforced self-regulation,” 
in which corporations tell their financial stories in an individualized 
way.  The fourth is its opposite, a plan in which essentially raw 
financial data is disclosed.  The fifth proposal focuses on making 
good financial disclosure a competitive benefit to firms, so that they 
would insist on good auditing.  The sixth and final proposal is that 
companies buy Financial Statement Insurance and disclose the 
premium amount.  This achieves all three goals.  Auditors would be 
strong intermediaries for the public because they would work for 
insurance companies that would demand good auditing.  Financial 
information would improve.  And, companies seeking to control 
insurance premiums would benefit from good disclosure.  Of all 
these suggestions, Financial Statement Insurance deserves the most 
serious consideration. 
B. Strategies for Reform 
1. Better Detective Auditing: The Federal Bureau of 
Audits 
An obvious question: If public company auditors are supposed to 
be public watchdogs, why aren’t they working for the government?  
Public auditors could solve many problems.  Corporations would not 
hire their own auditors, so auditors would no longer be certifiers, just 
detectives.  A bureau of government auditors could apply auditing 
standards more consistently, mitigating problems caused by 
ambiguous rules.  There are also good theoretical reasons for 
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government to be involved.  Corporations face a prisoner’s dilemma 
when it comes to financial disclosure: If all disclose accurate 
information (even if unfavorable), all benefit in the long run because 
investors will have confidence in the market and will buy U.S. equities 
in preference to other investments (e.g., real estate, bonds, foreign 
securities).  However, any one corporation can gain a short-term 
advantage by distorting its figures since investors will assume they are 
true.  If a significant number of corporations (even a low number 
may be significant) do this, all will be worse off because investors will 
distrust disclosures and take money out of U.S. equity markets, 
thereby making capital more expensive for all. 
Investors, too, face a dilemma.  If self-interested investors could 
wave a magic wand, the first choice of those who already own a 
corporation’s shares is for the corporation to disclose inaccurately 
rosy information so they can sell their shares at a high price.  The first 
choice of the potential buyers would be the opposite: disclosure of 
overly grim information, so they can buy shares cheaply.  Because, by 
hypothesis, the information is deceptive, and it is impossible to 
release different information to sellers and buyers in any event, these 
first choices are unavailable.  The second choice of all investors is that 
someone ensures that all information is accurate.  Solving 
coordination problems such as these is a classic government function. 
Another reason for government involvement is to further the 
public interest.  Even though capitalist societies leave investment 
decisions in private hands, the allocation of productive economic 
resources to entities that can best use them is a matter of extreme 
importance literally to everyone, including future generations and 
those too poor to ever participate in the market directly.  This is 
another reason that the government has a duty to see that investors 
get high-quality information to use in making decisions. 
Government auditing was considered and rejected in setting up 
the securities regulation regime.  Columbia law professor Adolf Berle, 
a leading member of President Roosevelt’s “brain trust,” 
unsuccessfully argued for establishment of a federal agency that 
would “exact full information about securities sold.”173  Dennis 
Kucinich, Democratic Congressman from Ohio and candidate for his 
party’s 2004 presidential nomination, introduced legislation in spring 
2002, “to establish a Federal Bureau of Audits within the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to conduct audits of all publicly 
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registered companies.”174  The proposed bureau would have audited 
each public company once a year. 
The House of Representatives voted down the Federal Bureau of 
Audits, 39 in favor to 381 opposed.175  Floor debates raised a number 
of problems.  One had to do with the auditor’s incentives.  Instead of 
seeking to please an owner, as in detective auditing, or the audited 
corporation, as in certification auditing, auditors would now have the 
same incentives as any civil servants.  Thus, Representative Nancy 
Kelly predicted that government auditors would “combine the same 
level of efficiency to accounting that HUD brought to housing . . . the 
effectiveness of the IRS in its customer service . . . [and] the 
accounting expertise of the Department of Defense with $100 
hammers.”176 
Representative Michael Oxley, House sponsor of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, worried that government auditing could cause too much 
government involvement in corporate business decision making: 
“This is a big government solution. . . .  I guess his message is, if you 
have lost faith in the free market, you need to have faith in big 
government.  I do not think people are ready to make that leap.”177  
 
 174 H.R. 3795, 107th Cong. (2002); see also H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(proposing substantially similar legislation as an amendment to a Sarbanes-Oxley 
predecessor bill).  For a scholarly discussion of the possibility of placing the 
government in charge of auditing, see Mark A. Gullotta, The SEC’s Auditor 
Independence Rule: Missing the Boat on Independence, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 221, 242–
44 (2001). 
 175 Final Vote Results for H.R. 3763, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/ 
2002/roll107.xml. 
 176 148 CONG. REC. H1572 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Kelly) 
(“[T]he amendment creates the Federal bureau of audits.  I guess it is modeled after 
the FBI so I can see auditors storming into companies with their calculators drawn, 
demanding individuals to freeze and drop their pencils.  The amendment seems to 
envision that the most efficient and effective auditor would be the U.S. Government.  
Somehow I just cannot agree with that, and I think this amendment is important for 
us to take a good look at for its unintended consequences.  I think the author is 
looking to combine the same level of efficiency to accounting that HUD brought to 
housing, perhaps.  I imagine that the author is looking for the effectiveness of the 
IRS in its customer service.  Finally, with the accounting expertise of the Department 
of Defense with $100 hammers, I am sure our corporations will be in the best hands 
possible.”) 
 177 See, for example, the floor remarks of Congressman Michael Oxley: 
This is a big government solution.  It is a one-size-fits-all solution.  It is 
essentially the neutron bomb.  I guess his message is, if you have lost 
faith in the free market, you need to have faith in big government.  I 
do not think people are ready to make that leap.  I think they 
understand intuitively, based on their investments, that they trust the 
free market, and they trust that our markets are the most open and 
efficient markets in the world, represented by the American 
marketplace. 
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One potential problem is possible corruption or misuse of the bureau 
for political purposes.  A more certain problem is that particular 
auditing standards can favor particular accounting standards, which 
in turn favor some underlying business decisions over others.  If the 
government sets auditing standards, its influence will trickle down to 
basic decisions.  It is one thing for government tax rules to induce 
particular underlying business decisions, since tax provisions often 
have just that goal (e.g., the home mortgage interest deduction 
encourages home ownership; Individual Retirement Accounts 
encourage savings).  In contrast, it would be perverse for government 
auditing rules to induce particular business decisions, since the 
purpose of auditing is to help provide transparency of information 
about business activity—not to change the activity. 
Another question is: Which government would employ 
government auditors?  Since basic corporate law is state law, logically, 
each state would audit companies incorporated there.  State audit 
bureaus, however, would surely differ in funding, expertise, and 
interpretations of accounting rules, destroying the comparability that 
federal regulation offers.  Just as state securities regulation (Blue Sky 
laws) has proven too variable and has been overshadowed by federal 
securities law,178 so too government auditing would almost surely have 
to be federal, but the specter of federal corporate law has always met 
resistance.  This backdoor imposition of uniformity would be no 
exception. 
Finally, if concerns about preserving private enterprise and 
federalism did not kill government auditing, it would probably run 
aground on funding.  Now, with corporations buying their own 
auditing services, the cost of auditing is veiled—companies can pass it 
along, if necessary, in the form of slightly higher prices.  Public 
provision of auditing services would make the cost obvious and bring 
it into the political arena where funding for economic regulatory 
agencies (such as the SEC and the Federal Trade Commission) has 
proven vulnerable.  Funding probably would be unreliable, or at the 
very least, perceived as such.  This would threaten, rather than 
bolster, investor confidence.  Funding could be more dependable if 
the government charged companies an annual fee for their audits.  
This, however, raises the possibility of inefficiency and expense 
 
148 CONG. REC. H1573 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Oxley). 
 178 Prohs, supra note 6, at 482–84. 
  
2005 AUDITING REGULATION 1075 
because the entity paying the bill (the issuer) will not be able to 
control the service bought with its money from the government.179 
As seen from the relative obscurity of the Kucinich proposal,180 
not even outrage at Enron and Arthur Andersen led to serious 
consideration of a Federal Bureau of Audits.  Short of an 
inconceivably worse scandal, it seems that U.S. securities disclosure 
auditing will remain in the private sector. 
2. Better Certification Auditing 
We now return to the current structure, in which corporations 
hire their own auditors.  Sarbanes-Oxley left this structure in place 
and made reforms to improve it.  As discussed in Part II.D, these 
reforms did not remove auditors’ incentives to favor the client’s 
interest over the public interest.  Are there further reforms that 
might do that? 
a. A Competitive, Independent Auditing Profession 
One possibility is a self-conscious return to old-style certification 
auditing.  This produces good auditing because of the auditor’s 
incentive to protect his or her reputation for quality work.  If truly 
reliable certification were available and investors came to seek out 
this certification, then issuers would have an incentive to use good 
auditors, creating a race to the top for auditing quality.  This can 
occur only if high-quality certification auditing is available to 
corporations that want to buy it.  Research disturbingly suggests that 
it is not. 
An extensive study of the financial disclosure of one thousand 
large public firms from 1997 to 2001 found no evidence of 
competition among the Big Four to offer and market high-quality 
auditing to their clients.  As noted earlier, the Big Four audit all 
companies with annual sales above $5 billion and ninety-seven 
percent of those with sales of $250 million or more.181  Researchers 
used the rates at which audited companies had to restate their 
disclosed financial statements as a surrogate for auditing 
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inaccuracies.  The theory is that inaccurate financial statements are 
difficult to cover up forever and eventually need to be corrected.182  
They found different rates of restatement among different years, 
different industries, and different regions of the country.  But they 
found no significant difference at all among public companies 
according to which major firm the company employed to audit its 
financial statements.183  The study concluded: “[M]anagers of large 
public companies who want to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors by choosing a tough, high quality auditor cannot do so.  
As measured by financial restatement rates, no such auditor is 
available: one cannot reject the hypothesis that they all are the 
same.”184  In short, sellers (accounting firms that do audits) form an 
oligopoly that offers buyers (the corporations disclosing financial 
information) little choice when it comes to quality. 
The securities laws could help create a market for quality 
auditing by tightening the independence rules in two ways.  The first 
step would be to require complete independence between auditor 
and client.  Sarbanes-Oxley still allows accounting firms to offer some 
services contemporaneously with the audit, notably tax advice.  As 
long as accounting firms are doing any additional business with 
clients, an incentive remains to ease up on the audit to protect the 
relationship.  The second step would be to limit the period during 
which an accounting firm can audit a corporation, perhaps to a fixed 
five-to seven-year audit period, followed by the same amount of time 
off. 
Taken together, these rules would significantly change the 
incentives of accounting firms.  Currently, a contract to perform both 
auditing and permitted non-audit services for a large corporation is a 
valuable asset to an accounting firm.  It can conceivably last forever.  
The partners in charge have a motive to protect this valuable client 
relationship.  If full auditor independence were mandated, this asset 
would cease to exist because firms could no longer do auditing and 
other services on an open-ended basis.  Accounting firms would need 
to choose.  They could not do both.  Because non-audit services may 
be more lucrative and would not be time-limited, the Big Four would 
probably try to keep the non-auditing work, and thus, send their 
clients to find another auditor.  Big corporations will still need audits, 
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so we may expect the emergence of new, specialized audit firms; call 
them the “Little Four.” 
There would be two benefits from this realignment of the 
profession.  At the Little Four and other firms concentrating on 
auditing, auditors would not just be handling a relatively unprofitable 
side-business.  They would be leaders able to set the professional 
tone.  At least some firms could be expected to emphasize the old 
ethos of independence and integrity.  In such an atmosphere, senior 
auditors could maintain their ethics, junior auditors could develop an 
ethics-first outlook, and firms could compete for clients based on 
reputation and audit quality. 
Additionally, under current law, the Big Four can still “bundle” 
the audit with allowed and approved non-auditing services and offer 
the whole package at an attractive price by doing the audit at low 
cost.  This makes it hard for smaller firms to compete.  A client 
corporation is likely to keep all of its auditing and accounting 
business with one firm if it receives a lower cost audit as part of the 
package.  If accounting firms could not offer auditing at loss-leader 
prices, however, corporations would have no reason not to diversify 
the rest of their non-audit service purchases as long as they had to 
find a new auditor anyway.  They could bid out work to many 
different accounting firms, creating more opportunity for the Little 
Four and others.185 
This discussion suggests that complete segregation of audit and 
non-audit services could help create competition in the market for 
quality auditing.  But if such choice became available, would 
corporations seek it out?  One issue is whether corporations will be 
willing to pay the extra cost of quality.  This will depend on whether 
they think it will produce a competitive advantage.186 
A knottier issue is whether the quality of audited financial 
statements can be transparent enough for the market to operate, so 
that issuers could truly compete in the area of quality of financial 
disclosure.  This is the well-known “lemons” problem.187  In order for 
buyers to reward high quality, they have to be able to identify it.  In a 
lemons market, however, buyers lack the information to distinguish 
among high-, medium-, and low-quality products or services.  When 
sellers cannot reliably signal high quality to buyers, it is rational for 
buyers to assume that all products or services are of equally lower 
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quality.  The standard example is an unregulated used car market, 
where there is no way to know which cars are lemons and which are 
not.  This uncertainty depresses the price of good cars as well as bad. 
b. Reforms in Information Standards 
The lemons problem may arise in auditing because GAAP rules 
may not allow sufficient quality discrimination.  They are so flexible 
that an auditor can attest that a report accords with GAAP, yet the 
report will not actually “present fairly in all material respects” the 
corporation’s true financial condition.188  For this reason, many 
commentators see a better GAAP as the key to better auditing.  
Others, however, do not think there is such a thing as a better GAAP.  
On this view, the books of large corporations are so complex that 
under any set of rules, it will always be possible to achieve technical 
compliance and still give a misleading picture.  If this is true, then 
better standards will not help.  Radical change would be needed.  I 
will next consider radical change at two ends of the spectrum. 
i. A British Solution: Enforced Self-Regulation 
One view of the problem with GAAP is that it is too detailed.  Far 
from giving welcome guidance and certainty, on this view, the large 
number of detailed, specific directives is just what makes it possible to 
follow the letter of the rules while violating their spirit. 
The British approach to this issue is instructive.  British 
accounting standards (U.K. GAAP) are far less detailed than their 
American counterpart (U.S. GAAP).  They enunciate principles more 
than rules, giving auditors and accountants more flexibility than their 
U.S. counterparts in complying with GAAP.189  Proponents of the 
British system argue that the lack of detailed rules to “hide behind” 
forces the accountant and auditor to actually live up to the principle 
of disclosure of the company’s true economic situation.190  The 
weakness of a principles-based system, however, is that it may give too 
little guidance.  In the words of the British scholars Ayres and 
Braithwaite, the requirement of “true and fair accounts” (U.K. 
GAAP) is a “bland admonishment” whose “very amorphousness 
hinders prosecution.”191  The cure, in their view, is “enforced self-
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regulation,” and they see corporate accounting as an ideal candidate 
for this approach.192 
In enforced self-regulation, each regulated entity devises its own 
plan for meeting the regulatory objective, sometimes in consultation 
with stakeholders.  For example, a public corporation’s stakeholders 
would include employees and community members along with 
investors, managers, and directors.  Once in place, the plan is the 
“law” for the entity, and violations can be penalized.  Tailored self-
regulatory standards are easily enforced because they contain clear 
guidelines that the corporation has already agreed are applicable and 
feasible.  “Creative compliance” is unlikely because the company 
selects and discloses its own set of rules to vindicate the regulatory 
principles.  Thus, following these rules achieves, rather than 
frustrates, the principle of financial transparency.193  Companies have 
an incentive to follow their plans because it is easy to tell if they are 
not following them.  And, they have an incentive to commit 
themselves to a high level of quality in the plan because the plans are 
disclosed to the public. 
Any advantages of enforced self-regulation, however, are 
overwhelmed by the problem of comparability.  The hallmark of 
enforced self-regulation is that there is no single standard, but rather 
many roads to the regulatory goal.  Each company is different.  In 
financial disclosure, however, the regulatory goal requires that 
disclosed information enable investors to compare corporations.  
Comparison requires a common measure.  If enforced self-regulation 
were used, investors would need to analyze and digest company plans 
and then translate the information into some comparable form.  
Investors or their intermediaries would simply end up reinventing 
general standards, with the difference that there would be no 
regulatory enforcement to back them up. 
ii. Raw Information Disclosure 
An opposite approach to allowing self-tailored analysis of 
corporate financial information is to forego the analysis altogether.  
This reform is based on the observation that at its root, the problem 
of creative compliance with the GAAP rules is that accountants and 
auditors analyze information in a way that turns out to be misleading.  
Self-regulation tries to improve the analysis by making it more 
individualized, so that companies cannot get around the rules.  
Alternatively, instead of telling companies to disclose audited 
 
 192 Id. at 106–09. 
 193 Id. 
  
1080 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1029 
financial reports, Congress could require them to disclosure raw 
disaggregated data, such as daily revenue, materials expenditure, 
lease payments, etc.  Investors and their intermediaries, armed with 
computer capacity, would do their own interpreting.  Some 
companies might still offer analyzed information, as they do now, 
knowing that others would be reviewing it and comparing it with the 
underlying data.194  Other companies may skip the expense of their 
own analysis and let the numbers speak for themselves. 
Supporters of simplified disclosure rightly link it to continuous 
disclosure, as has Congress.195  Through Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress 
authorized the SEC to require corporations to disclose material 
changes in operations or financial condition “on a rapid and current 
basis” and “in plain English.”196  This makes sense.  Stocks now trade 
virtually instantaneously and financial news is reported around the 
clock.  It is somewhat anachronistic for the SEC’s disclosure regime 
to follow the schedule, developed in the 1930s, of annual and 
quarterly reports with fifteen-day supplemental filings for a few 
material events.197  The posting of these filings on the internet 
through the SEC’s EDGAR system198 and the accelerated deadlines for 
some large corporations to file their quarterly and annual reports199 
does not change the fact that the information is still compiled only at 
these relatively long intervals.  Even the best information represents 
only a snapshot, not a moving picture. 
The persistence of quarterly reports in a world of near-constant 
financial news reporting is not just quaint but dangerous.  For 
instance, it enables corporations to engage in “earnings 
management,”200 the practice of manipulating accounting to show 
quarterly earnings that meet publicized projections, even if that 
means reporting income and expenses in the wrong quarter.  
Corporations also may release overoptimistic pro forma earnings to the 
press, enjoy the resulting rise in share prices, and then correct the 
information with little fanfare in official filings weeks later.201  
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Sarbanes-Oxley tries to discourage this by requiring executives to 
disgorge bonuses and profits they earn through manipulating share 
prices.202  With continuous information disclosure, these deceptive 
practices would be impossible because they depend on the lag time 
between the unofficial projections, which can be made with few legal 
consequences, and the official regulatory filings. 
Though this reform proposal is directed at the nature of the 
information disclosed, we are interested in it here because of its 
effect on the structure of the relationship between auditor and client, 
and therefore, on the auditor’s incentives.  If companies disclose raw 
financial information, the job now done by auditors would be split in 
two.  Corporations would hire other auditors to design and monitor 
their information disclosure systems.  Then, investors or other 
entities would hire auditors to review and analyze the disclosed raw 
information. 
The auditors engaged by the corporation would concentrate on 
issues such as designing and monitoring information systems and 
internal controls.  They would not be reviewing the client’s analysis of 
the financial information, with its many accounting judgment calls 
and numbers that rest on future projections (e.g., the value of leases, 
intellectual property, options, etc.).  There would be no such analysis 
and no such predictions.  Continuous disclosure gives companies 
reason to work with these auditors to design the best information-
disclosure systems they can.  First, with disclosure made on a 
continuous basis, corporations will face additional exposure to 
liability for material misstatements or omissions and presumably will 
turn to their auditors to help minimize it.203  Second, good 
information disclosure should create a competitive advantage for the 
company that makes it.  When investors bear the cost of information 
analysis, they will presumably reward corporations that disclose 
reliable information in an easy-to-use form.  Thus, the auditors 
engaged by the corporation would find it easier to do their job in a 
way that protects the public interest.  Their clients would have reason 
to demand better disclosure, and their jobs would involve less 
exercise of judgment and the attendant opportunity to shade 
judgments in a client’s favor. 
The other half of the current auditor’s job is reviewing the 
client’s analysis of financial information according to GAAP.  The 
corporation’s auditor would not conduct this review because the 
information released by the client would not be analyzed.  However, 
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someone will still need to digest the raw numbers in order to make 
them useful as a basis for investment decisions.  This will create a 
second body of “analysis auditors” to serve investors.  At first blush, 
this seems to promise a good alignment of incentives; as in detective 
auditing, the auditor will be working for the information user. 
The problem, however, is that investors come in a variety of 
shapes and sizes.  Institutional investors will be able to hire high-
quality auditors who will report to them directly and have incentives 
to read the numbers skeptically and carefully.204  These auditors 
should be able to do a good job.  They will be dealing with fresh 
information that they can more easily evaluate and analyze in 
whatever way best serves the client-investor’s information needs.205 
Other investors, however, will not be able to have full-time 
auditors on their payrolls.  Instead, they will need to obtain financial 
analysis elsewhere.  Presumably, a body of “consulting auditors” will 
market their independent services.  Their incentive to do a good 
audit of the raw data will depend on how valuable quality is in 
marketing their services.  There is a potential lemons problem here.  
If auditing quality is not transparent to consumers (and it may well 
not be), then these consultants could end up competing along other 
lines.  The role of these independent consulting auditors is analogous 
to the role played by securities analysts now.  Their many failures to 
give impartial advice206 suggest that while this proposal can result in 
good in-house “private watchdogs” for some institutional investors, it 
will not necessarily ensure that “public watchdog” auditing is available 
generally.  And, viewed at a macro level, the sheer number of 
“investor-audits” will surely entail duplication of efforts and a waste of 
resources.207  These considerations suggest that investors are not 
necessarily a better principal for the auditor than the government.  
We therefore return to considering whether the current structure, in 
which auditors work for audited corporations, can be preserved but 
reformed. 
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c. The Elusive Market for Good Disclosure 
I will assume for purposes of this discussion that corporations 
will seek out and buy better auditing only if it gives them a 
competitive advantage with their own customers and investors.208  
Such competition is not obvious right now; there are no corporate 
full-page Wall Street Journal ads promising “We Will Not Try to Fool 
the Auditors,” nor does “Fair Financial Disclosure” appear on 
consumer product labels along with “Cruelty-free” (cosmetics) and 
“Fair Trade” (coffee and cocoa).  Competition on the axis of 
financial disclosure quality would require auditors to compete for 
customers, that is, investors who care about it and will use it as a 
reason to invest.  Who are these investor-customers? 
Some investors might buy shares in a company just because it 
offers better financial disclosure.  Ethical investment funds are an 
obvious possibility.  However, these funds generally seek a variety of 
characteristics in companies they own, such as good labor and 
environmental practices.  It might be difficult for issuers to gain a 
significant advantage just by offering fair financial disclosure.  
Additionally, these funds do not represent a huge segment of the 
market. 
The other possible customers of financial disclosure quality are 
investors who care about an issuer’s long-term success.  In the short 
run, good auditing may well hurt share prices by disclosing 
information about a company’s failure and limitations.  However, it is 
a benefit in the long run.  Misleading disclosure rarely does more 
than buy time, and there are substantial reputational and economic 
costs when the truth finally emerges.209  The problem is that investors 
generally seek financial gain based on the long-term prospect of an 
entire portfolio of diversified investments, not just a particular 
company.  For any particular company, good financial disclosure 
would be just one of many indicia of future success.  It could not 
make up for a bad product, for instance.  Nevertheless, good 
financial disclosure could well become one among many reasons for 
long-term investors to pick X Company’s shares over Y Company’s, 
and that could provide the needed competitive advantage. 
Note however, that this competition can only take place if the 
reforms discussed above have already been made and (a) auditors 
compete for business on the basis of quality and (b) GAAP is 
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reformed so that higher (and lower) quality financial disclosure 
auditing is more obvious to the market.  Neither is the case now. 
The SEC has tried to create investor demand for quality via 
regulation of mutual funds.  Mutual funds invest the savings of some 
ninety-three million people210 and have a long-term outlook.  It 
seemed as if they might have had an incentive to become involved in 
the governance of the corporations they invest in, in order to make 
those corporations improve their financial disclosure.  In 2002, the 
Department of Labor issued an interpretation of federal pension law 
stating that one of the fiduciary duties of fund managers is to vote 
proxies on shares that the plan holds where the vote concerns an 
issue “that may affect the value of the plan’s investment.”211  In order 
to encourage funds to participate in corporate affairs, the SEC 
followed with a rule that funds must publicize their proxy votes:212  “As 
major shareholders, mutual funds may play a vital role in monitoring 
the stewardship of the companies in which they invest.”213 
Mutual funds, so far, do not seem to want to be surrogate 
regulators of corporate behavior.  The largest U.S. mutual funds 
strongly (but unsuccessfully) opposed the SEC voting disclosure rule.  
They feared it would invite lobbying from special interest groups, 
thereby distracting the funds from getting their investors the best 
return on their savings.214  This opposition is not surprising.  Mutual 
funds historically have avoided involvement in corporate affairs 
except in rare instances, for example, if a fund ends up holding so 
many shares in a particular corporation that selling them all at once 
would depress the price.215  A fund might have to get involved in 
corporate governance if an investment policy requires it to hold 
shares in set proportions (such as an index fund).  In such a 
situation, it could not sell poor performers and should therefore try 
 
 210 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 n.9 (Feb. 7, 2003) 
(proposing regulations subsequently codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270 & 274). 
 211 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(1) (2005). 
 212 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, 274 (2005). 
 213 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 n.9. 
 214 John J. Brennan & Edward C. Johnson, No Disclosure: The Feeling Is Mutual, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2003, at A14; Robert D. Hershey, Signs Are Unclear on the S.E.C.’s 
Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at C18. 
 215 Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1435–36 (2002). 
  
2005 AUDITING REGULATION 1085 
to improve them internally.216  Otherwise, most funds have pursued a 
strategy of exit, not voice, following the “Wall Street Rule”: If 
investors don’t like what management is doing, they should sell their 
shares and take their money somewhere else.217 
Some mutual funds did take an interest in long-term corporate 
welfare after the recent scandals.  Some voted their shares to oppose 
executive stock options,218 and several announced that they would 
take a more activist stance and impose stricter guidelines regarding 
corporate governance.219  Nevertheless, the general approach of 
mutual funds toward long-term investing remains unclear.  Unless 
funds could be counted on to reward good long-term corporate 
behavior, it is hard to see how they could be the catalyst for 
competition among public corporations in the arena of auditing and 
financial disclosure quality. 
C. The New Watchdog: Financial Statement Insurers 
Is there any private entity with an incentive to insist on the bold 
detective auditing that will then incidentally serve the public’s need 
for corporate transparency?  So far, the outlook is not bright.  The 
big accounting firms, who dominate auditing, do not currently 
compete with each other to offer high-quality work.  Though 
regulation could nudge them in that direction, the GAAP standards 
would have to be reformed so that financial statement quality is more 
obvious.  And, even if audit quality were more transparent, we have 
not identified a strong reason for corporations to pay extra for it.  
Corporations could disclose raw data, leaving investors to hire their 
own auditors to analyze it.  Large investors who do hire auditors 
might approach the status of medieval lords with their own detective 
auditors combing the financial data for problems.  But small investors 
would need to buy such auditing services from consultants, who 
might be able to succeed in the business without actually providing 
the needed watchdog-quality auditing. 
In short, we are still seeking a principal for the auditor with both 
its own, direct interest in good detective work and the power to see 
that it is delivered. 
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1. The Mechanics of FSI 
An intriguing suggestion is that insurance companies could be 
the proper principals for auditors.  The proposal is Financial 
Statement Insurance (FSI) for public companies.220  A Model 
Financial Statement Insurance Act, patterned on the Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939, has been drafted by Professor Lawrence Cunningham221 
(and described in detail by Professor Joshua Ronen222).  With FSI, 
companies would have the option to insure themselves against claims 
that their financial statements are misleading.  FSI insurers would 
hire auditors to review the quality of the corporation’s accounting 
and estimate the risk that it will mislead investors.  Insurers would 
offer companies coverage on the basis of an expert risk assessor’s 
report.  In Ronen’s proposal, shareholders would vote whether to 
accept the maximum insurance offered, an amount suggested by 
management, or no insurance at all.  The key is that the FSI insurer, 
and not the corporation, would commission an audit of the financial 
statements.  Based on the audit, FSI will be issued (or declined if the 
insurer found the risk unacceptable), and the premium price 
determined.223 
Crucially, Ronen proposes that the policy coverage amount and 
premium cost of a corporation’s FSI policy be made public.  The 
amount of insurance will notify investors of what they might hope to 
recover in fraud litigation.  Though plaintiff investors may seek more, 
courts could limit damages on the theory that what investors paid for 
the shares already reflected the limited insurance coverage.224  More 
importantly, the disclosure of the premium amount would provide 
information about the quality of the financial information, much as 
political polls are reported together with the margin of error so that 
readers can assess their reliability.  High insurance at a low premium 
would tell investors that the financial statements are reliable.  Low 
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coverage at a high premium would give the opposite message.  
Investors would then have valuable information—what might be 
called “information about the information”—to use in deciding 
whether to buy a particular company’s shares. 
The FSI plan also contemplates expedited evaluation of claims.  
A fiduciary organization selected jointly by the insurer and the 
insured corporation would do the initial review.  Then an 
independent expert answering to the organization and the insurer 
would review the claim.  With the expert’s approval, the claim would 
be paid expeditiously.225  If the claim were denied at any stage, the 
investor could sue the corporation, as it can do now. 
FSI, according to Professor Ronen, would also allow GAAP to 
become more principle based.  Properly motivated auditors and 
corporations would no longer need the guidance that complex rules 
are supposed to provide.226  Nor would comparability be a reason to 
keep the detailed GAAP rules.  With FSI, the financial reports would 
provide a rounded narrative and investors could compare 
corporations by looking at the policy limits/premium disclosure. 
2. Should FSI Be Mandatory? 
A threshold question is whether FSI should be mandatory.  So 
far, discussion has seemed to assume that it should not.  Professor 
Ronen proposes that after an initial “jumpstart” period in which FSI 
is mandatory in order to develop the insurance market, individual 
corporations should be able to decide whether or not they want it.227  
Professor Lawrence Cunningham would not even have an initial 
period of mandatory FSI, but would simply offer corporations the 
choice of buying FSI or using traditional financial statement 
auditing.228  This, he says, would offer “more effective self-tailoring of 
the financial reporting and assurance process.”229 
The argument that FSI should be voluntary to allow corporations 
to tailor their own financial disclosure proves too much.  By this 
reasoning, why not allow corporations to disclose unaudited financial 
statements, statements audited by auditors meeting only some or 
none of the Sarbanes-Oxley independence rules, or statements in 
 
 225 Id. at 51. 
 226 Id. at 60–67. 
 227 Id. at 68; cf. Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United 
States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7 (2002) (“[I]t would take only a 
small tweak to [Ronen’s proposed] system to imagine minimum coverage 
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 228 Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 147, at 427–32. 
 229 Id. at 427. 
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formats230 other than those allowed by the SEC?  Any regulation has 
the effect of depriving market actors of the ability to make their own 
choices in the products sold or information released.  The question 
becomes whether the good to be gained through regulation 
outweighs the evil of limiting choice.  This Article has discussed the 
advantages of FSI.  There is strong reason to believe that FSI cannot 
work unless it is mandatory because of the way in which investors are 
likely to react to a double regulatory scheme. 
Recall that if FSI is voluntary, the SEC will need to keep 
regulating the auditors and monitoring the financial statements of 
those corporations choosing not to buy it.  If we assume that 
corporations who reject the outside assessment of the FSI insurer and 
its auditor in favor of hiring their own auditors are more likely than 
insured corporations to produce deceptive financial statements, then 
residual SEC regulation of these corporations could be a problem.  It 
could lull investors into the false belief that their financial statements 
are as good as, if not better than, those of insured corporations. 
Share prices of the uninsured corporations could be doubly 
higher than warranted by economic reality.  Not only would there be 
a greater chance that their financial statements are misleading, but 
the market might not sufficiently discount for the lack of insurance 
due to misplaced reliance on residual regulation of auditing.  While 
sophisticated investors might understand that SEC regulation was not 
necessarily a mark of quality, less sophisticated investors could be 
mislead.  These corporations, in other words, could benefit by not 
buying FSI.  This could trigger a race to the bottom, destroying the 
system and leaving FSI to be used by only a small top tier of 
corporations.  On the other hand, mandatory minimum FSI will 
provide a level playing field and comparability of information.  For 
every corporation, investors will know that the auditors work for 
insurers and that FSI coverage and premium information is available 
for comparison. 
Mandatory FSI would benefit the regulatory system in two ways.  
First, the SEC would not need to provide residual regulation for non-
insured issuers.  It could get out of the business of routine auditing 
regulation and disclosure oversight, freeing resources for other uses, 
including prosecution of what should be a reduced number of 
deceptive financial disclosure cases.  Second, if all issuers buy FSI, all 
of them will be able to disclose the amount of the FSI premium, 
which will be an independent indicator of the quality of financial 
 
 230 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission Forms List, 
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statements.  If FSI is optional, this information will be available for 
some companies but not all. 
Furthermore, mandatory FSI will still afford corporations a great 
degree of flexibility.  Shareholders can select the insurer, terms of 
coverage (within limits), and the amount of coverage.  The law would 
set a legal minimum of coverage, perhaps calculated, as Professor 
Ronen suggests, as a multiple of the corporation’s “largest negative 
earnings surprise” over the previous three to five years,231 but 
companies could signal quality by buying more.  Thus, by mandating 
FSI, the government would extricate itself from auditing regulation, 
while providing a “floor” of good behavior for the market and 
reliability for investors. 
As a significant departure from current regulation, FSI will 
certainly require testing; for instance, it could be optional for a 
period of time, or it could be mandatory in selected industries or for 
issuers in a particular market-capitalization size range.  Nevertheless, 
strong consideration should be given to making it mandatory to 
obtain its full benefits without wasteful and confusing duplicate 
regulation. 
3. Elements of a Regulatory Framework 
Whether FSI is mandatory or whether it is just a permitted 
alternative to current auditing practices, there should be federal 
minimum standards for FSI policies in order to see that policies 
adequately protect investors and that the disclosed information 
regarding policy size and premium really does give investors useful 
information about the corporation. 
Regarding the content of policies, as Professor Cunningham 
points out, FSI is more akin to title insurance than to traditional 
liability insurance.232  A company writing title insurance examines a 
property’s deed and title documents and, if it is satisfied that title is 
good, insures that there are no defects.  FSI insurers will likewise 
examine the financial statements and, if satisfied, issue a policy.  Each 
is insuring the dependability of information, rather than offering 
protection against fortuitous events.  In both cases, claims may not 
arise until years later.  Thus, FSI policies should be occurrence based, 
rather than claims based.233  If a policy is occurrence based, it covers 
damages resulting from an occurrence while it is in effect, even if a 
claim does not surface until later.  This way, if an investor relies on 
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misrepresentation while the policy is in force, the claim is covered, 
even if the policy is cancelled the next day.  Investors could count on 
having an FSI policy to turn to as long as they confirmed before 
investing that the corporation was insured. 
Insurance policies should also be required to cover claims 
against insured corporations that are bankrupt.234  This is important 
even though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made debts for judgments and 
settlements connected with securities law violations non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy.235  Non-dischargeability only preserves a 
debt—it does nothing to make funds available to pay it.  With 
insolvent corporations unable to pay fraud judgments, investors 
naturally look to other defendants; but in 1995, Congress severely 
limited the doctrine of joint and several liability for securities fraud.  
A corporation that commits securities fraud often does so on its way 
into bankruptcy, but may be aided by a number of parties that survive 
and are solvent such as lawyers, securities analysts, and auditors.  
These solvent parties, however, are little comfort to injured investors, 
because they, like the disclosing corporation itself, can be held liable 
only for their proportionate share of the losses.236  In short, even if 
investors are awarded full damages in a fraud proceeding, they are 
often unable to collect.  FSI could remedy this. 
Insurance coverage that survives the demise of the insured 
corporation will not only protect investors, but should also lead 
insurers to take steps to reduce the risk of catastrophic loss.  For 
instance, in some cases, insurers could require that policies be 
backed by executives’ personal guarantees to prevent them from 
looting a corporation, keeping the proceeds, and leaving the insurer 
to pay off deceived investors.237  Insurers may also insist that 
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corporations communicate better with stock-holding employees.  
Many of the small investors hurt in the Enron collapse were Enron 
employees who owned company stock in their retirement accounts, 
had not been encouraged to diversify, and were prevented from 
selling shares by a freeze just at the time share prices were 
plummeting.238 
Furthermore, the FSI scheme may need to regulate how insurers 
set FSI premiums.  A key aspect of FSI is that disclosed premium costs 
and policy limits give investors information about the quality of 
corporations’ financial statements.  This assumes that insurers will 
underwrite carefully, so that the premium a company pays for FSI 
actually represents the risk that its financial statements might be 
misleading.  One worry is that to compete for business, insurers will 
set premiums too low.239  This is hardly unique to FSI but occurs in 
any insurance market and is met by countervailing economic 
pressure to correctly assess premiums so that enough money is taken 
in to cover the risk of having to pay claims.  State insurance laws may 
also regulate premiums to minimize the risk of insurers becoming 
insolvent.240  And, insurers should find it easier to calculate FSI 
premiums than liability insurance premiums.  As with title insurance, 
the bulk of the cost is in investigation, rather than in reserves for 
paying claims (as with liability policies).  Once the insurer has 
audited the financial statements, it should have an excellent idea of 
the risk. 
Another worry is that corporations might buy too much 
insurance if they believe that this shows particular confidence in the 
quality of their books.  As Professor Cunningham suggests, this can 
be resolved by linking coverage to a metric such as the company’s 
market capitalization.241  Corporations might also try to manipulate to 
their advantage the premium/coverage figures through coverage 
choices that affect premium price, such as whether insurance is 
primary or secondary and whether it includes providing a defense to 
suit or only indemnification of liability.  It may be wise to prohibit 
some of these choices through regulation; in any event, all of these 
choices made by an issuer should be disclosed, perhaps in a standard 
form chart, so that investors can make comparisons.242 
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A related and more serious objection is that insurers might 
aggregate risk by charging companies that are known to present a 
high risk for issuing misleading financial information the same 
premium as those known to present low risks.  If this were to happen, 
premium cost will obviously be less useful information.  There are 
both market and regulatory checks available to control this sort of 
pooling.  The market check is that insurers will want an accurate risk 
assessment so that the premium is set at a level that covers expected 
claims.  Although for many kinds of insurance, insurers classify 
applicants as high-, medium-, or low-risk, and then use appropriate 
form contracts, this is generally not done for Directors & Officers and 
entity insurance.  There, policies are individually tailored to the 
company’s particular risks.243  Since FSI involves issues of similar 
complexity, there is no reason not to expect insurers to tailor FSI 
policies similarly.  They will have the information to do it; in Ronen’s 
proposal, insurers will do a preliminary audit before even offering an 
FSI policy.244 
Insurers might pool the risks of smaller companies in particular 
industries, on the theory that the risk assessment can be made with 
rough accuracy, and thus avoid the expense of a specific inquiry.  
This could benefit small companies by lowering their insurance costs, 
though it concededly would produce FSI premiums that did not 
precisely reflect individuated risk.  Another danger might be that FSI 
insurers would pool FSI risk with risks on, for instance, life insurance 
or accident policies. 
These pooling problems do not seem insurmountable but they 
should not be ignored.  One solution would be for the SEC to 
prohibit insurers from pooling FSI risks with non-FSI risks.  Proof of 
this could be in the form of a state regulator’s certification that the 
FSI insurer would present to the SEC.  The SEC would determine 
which insurance products are “Qualified FSI.”  The SEC could also 
provide a procedure allowing insurance companies to show the need 
for risk pooling for companies below a particular size.  If a risk pool 
were approved, the disclosed premium amount would also bear a 
notation indicating that the insurer had used pooled risk in 
calculating the individual FSI premiums and perhaps referring the 
investor to the insurer’s application and SEC decision (which could 
be posted on the SEC’s website). 
In short, FSI is a good market solution to the problem of 
misleading financial disclosure.  However, there must be a regulatory 
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framework to ensure that all public companies use it, that coverage 
survives the demise of the insured corporation, and that premiums 
correctly reflect risk. 
4. FSI Returns Auditors to the Role of Detective 
The overwhelming advantage of FSI is that auditors will finally 
be free to play one role only, that of detective.  Because the FSI 
insurer wants to minimize its risk, it will insist on a thorough, 
impartial audit, including verification of assets and revenue, rather 
than just sample testing of records.  Auditors will comply to please 
the insurer, who can offer repeat business, if not an in-house 
position. 
 Mandatory FSI will also demonstrate the traits of a healthy 
disclosure system.  It will create several strong intermediaries for 
investors.  The FSI insurer is obviously such an intermediary.  The 
fiduciary claims-handling organization is another; it will make 
investors better able to recover damages if they have been deceived.  
FSI also provides more useful information.  Corporations will 
produce better financial statements to begin with and auditors will 
audit them more carefully.  Crucially, the policy size and cost will 
indicate the insurer’s assessment of the quality of the financial 
statements, a valuable piece of additional information.  Finally, FSI 
gives corporations incentives to improve disclosure voluntarily in 
order to qualify for high coverage at a low premium.  The savings may 
not represent a great deal of money to the corporation, though they 
could matter to the division that prepares the financial statements.  
More importantly, the low premium will signal to investors that the 
company’s statements are accurate. 
FSI could be accommodated with less change in current 
practices than might be expected.  First, FSI will work within existing 
liability rules because investors will be able to compare FSI premiums 
and policy amounts at any level (i.e., if liability rules favor 
corporations, all rates will be low; if they favor investors, all will be 
high).  It can be objected that the existence of insurance will 
encourage claims, some of which will be false or exaggerated.  The 
expedited claims process that Ronen proposes245 should be able to 
deal with these claims; and, as noted, the PSLRA already sets a high 
bar for pleading a securities fraud case.246  Second, there would be 
less need for the sort of changes in the accounting profession 
discussed above.  Insurers could simply engage auditors from the 
 
 245 Id. at 51. 
 246 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
  
1094 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1029 
existing Big Four.  Because of the insurers’ need for a good audit, 
they may well refuse to hire auditors whose firms do non-audit work 
for the audited corporation.  Very likely, insurers would hire in-house 
accountants to make a career of auditing.  Third, there would be no 
need to change GAAP because auditors will have no incentive to 
manipulate the rules.  As Professor Ronen states, FSI could make it 
easier to reform GAAP to focus on principles, not detail.  Finally, the 
SEC will not need to get into the business of regulating insurance 
companies, but can instead cooperate with state insurance 
regulators.247 
With this proposal, we have come full circle.  Like the medieval 
lord, the insurer will be a principal with a self-interested reason to 
demand candor from the auditor.  FSI resolves the confusion of 
auditors’ roles inherent in securities disclosure auditing since 1933.  
Auditors can return to their first job of being good detectives, finding 
and reporting defects in financial statements. 
CONCLUSION 
There is something disturbing about corporations hiring their 
own auditors.  As a federal judge commented in introducing an SEC 
roundtable on auditing reform, it is as if slaughterhouses hired their 
own meat inspectors.248  The intuition that something is wrong is 
confirmed when we analyze the law to see what role it expects the 
auditor to play. 
Historically, medieval auditors were detectives whose job was to 
scrutinize the accounts of their clients’ agents in depth.  Later, 
auditors did certification auditing, in which their clients engaged 
them to review and approve information to be disclosed to others.  In 
auditing for securities financial disclosure, the law calls on the 
auditor to play the role of detective.  The auditor, however, is still 
hired by the audited corporation, which has reason to prefer merely 
certification auditing.  Even as reformed by Sarbanes-Oxley, federal 
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securities law reflects this divide.  Some rules try to ensure good 
detective work (e.g., by having the auditor report to directors, not 
management), while others try to ensure honest certification (e.g., by 
limiting business relations between auditor and audit client).  But all 
leave the auditor in the difficult position of having a legal duty—to 
serve as a “watchdog for the public”—that is, at the very least, in 
tension with the interests of his or her client. 
Regulatory reforms, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have 
never separated the auditor’s two roles.  To succeed, however, reform 
must give auditors clear direction.  If auditors continue to be hired by 
the audited corporation and to play the certification role, they must 
be fully independent of the client and be able to assess information 
quality against clear standards.  If they are to be detectives, they must 
have an appropriate principal, namely, someone who wants a candid 
audit report.  In this Article I have tested a number of reform 
proposals against these criteria. 
Of four proposals to improve certification auditing, the one best 
able to stop auditor corruption and encourage competition for 
quality auditing is probably real-time disclosure of simplified 
information.  This is promising, but has the potential to recreate the 
current problem if investors come to rely on financial information 
analysts who may have their own incentives to be sloppy or less than 
candid.  As for detective auditing, the key is that the auditor report to 
someone who, unlike the audited corporation, has an interest of its 
own in ensuring aggressive auditing.  One proposal is that auditors 
work for the government, but political concerns over federalism and 
government interference in business decisions, as well as the 
likelihood of undependable funding seem to rule out that option. 
The best reform proposal is that corporations be required to 
insure their financial statements against liability for misleading 
investors.  Insurers would hire auditors to ensure that the statements 
were not misleading.  Because insurers have a financial interest in 
good auditing in order to avoid paying claims, they will want the 
auditor to be a good detective.  Thus, FSI would fulfill the original 
vision of securities law as harnessing private incentives to serve the 
public good.  It ends the certification/detective confusion that has 
plagued public auditing for seventy years.  It finally gives auditors a 
client who wants them to be the public’s watchdog. 
 
